At first Strategic Communication requirements sounded like just another good idea from the list of many assignments due throughout our time at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) here at FT Leavenworth. But after allowing some time for the concept to sink in, it is clearly present in ways that I had not previously considered. Strategic communication is inherent in every activity we undertake whether it be in our military function or in service to the community. I will examine two examples of how media communication or more precisely the management of information is critical to the outcomes we expect after mission or project is accomplished. The critical aspect of information management is the ability to control your messages while minimizing the negative impact of those seeking to distort, disrupt or manipulate for their own advantage your information. This is especially critical today since most of us get our information from maybe one or two sources, this because most of the time we are overloaded with other issues so we tend to form our opinions based on the limited amount of available filtering time, understanding of the sources, their bias, and ultimately how that makes us susceptible to potential misinformation.
Current media and military relations doctrine involve the process of developing field grade officers into strategic communicators for their organizations. After completing this training I now agree that effective media communication skills are essential in the performance of my duties as a field grade officer. The ability to present clear and concise information and messages in conjunction with the Public Affairs Office is critical in supporting current and future operations of the Army. My first example cites the supporting role of today’s field grade officer as one of the principle organizational communicators for information and command messages to the media.
Effective media communication is the ability of leaders to successfully transmit command messages in order to gain and/or maintain control over circumstances which if not managed correctly could have negative consequences on overall operations and public opinion. A field grade officers understanding of this operational challenge is absolutely essential to the attainment of mission objectives within an Area of Operations (AO). Leaders when given the opportunity to present information must be able to exercise control through their messages to shape and clarify a mission’s task and purpose. Field grade officers have the greatest control over message output since they assist in the planning and development mission objectives for the organization. Therefore, a good leader must be able to unambiguously transmit organizational goals when operations are proceeding according to a plan and more significantly when operations could be perceived as negative.
My first example recounts a case study used in class describing the actions of a support battalion conducting humanitarian operations in Azerbaijan, as students we assumed the role of the Battalion Commander and were required to effectively communicate a series of command messages during a press conference after a civil disturbance occurred at one of our logistical bases. We learned that one of the essential functions of the Commander is to foresee what type of information may be asked before a negative incident occurs. The Commander should ask himself this question. What are my command messages? [1] The practice of determining command messages must be considered part of the daily briefing process and incorporated into all staff planning through the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP). The development of the Public Affairs Estimate and Annex in support of the operations order is critical to the unit’s overall mission. [2] The annex must contain at a minimum the command messages and specific Rules of Engagement (ROE) for conducting media operations. The Public Affairs Annex then acts as a guide for subordinate leaders to pass on the Media ROE and command messages to their soldiers. The higher level Commander’s guidance assists us in formulating a series of command messages in support of our unit’s mission. In the Azerbaijan situation I learned that as the Commander one of my roles is to act as the effective communicator who attempts to maintain control over situations which could have potential negative effects on our operations and public opinion. All the CGSC students had the opportunity to conduct a live press conference complete with cameras and classmates acting as reporters. One key aspect of this event was the Commander’s ability to maintain a calm and confident demeanor during the delivery of an opening statement. Two other important aspects are the need to reemphasize command messages and deliver a clear and concise closing statement prior to taking questions; all these actions when taken together tended to set the tone for a successful press conference. Through this exercise I was able to successfully exhibit the aspects of effective communication by managing the output of information after the civil disturbance. The transmission of information in this case resulted in the decrease in tensions and the prevention of serious damage to public opinion potentially resulting in major changes to the support battalion’s role during our humanitarian aide operation.
My second example references the removal and replacement of the trees at Hasting House on FT Leavenworth for the Girl Scouts as a community service project undertaken by our staff group. This particular project was not military related but as my classmate stated in his blog titled "Tree Camaraderie" we can relate it directly to any potential military project much like the ones being carried out over in Iraq and Afghanistan at this very moment. It requires prior coordination and planning using the MDMP process to ensure a successful outcome for the organization which the activity was originally undertaken. Success is dependent upon meeting the needs of in this case the Girl Scouts, however this could be any public service project carried out overseas. The key ingredient in this is the implied support of the larger community. For instance is the removal and replacement of these trees conducive to the policies of FT Leavenworth and do we have their concurrence. We must be aware of any negative public perception due to other groups or individuals who could be working against us to distort our intention or manipulate public opinion against our proposed actions. In some cases if the project is large enough the town or community will form a committee and hold hearings to allow for public comment before beginning the project. In many cases the project will be put to a vote since it may involve a large sum of money or have an impact life in the community. We have had to learn these lessons the over in Iraq and Afghanistan, and over time we have improved in the ability to strategically communicate our intentions and prevent misinformation. Even though the tree project is relatively simple it carries with it potential ripple effects in the larger community, we could call these 2nd and 3rd order effects. This is where being a critical thinking organizational leader is necessary. I as a field grade officer must understand these subtle interrelationships and be able to for see their effects on my unit, and the community in order to achieve the desired outcome.
As a field grade officer I am the key, on one hand I may act as the spokesman for the organization, for example during an operation or mission, on the other hand I will be the one working with the Public Affairs Office to develop media information and policy for senior level officers. In both of these situations I am acting as the liaison for the organization transmitting messages to the media in order to gain and maintain control over a particular set of circumstances. In our country we are fortunate that our Constitution includes the Freedom of the Press, others are not, this tells us as military leaders that the media has the power to shape and change public opinion. Shifts in public opinion can result in policy changes to military operations. Some policy changes are not always beneficial to our organization. Therefore, in order to assist in the direction and implementation of Army policies is absolutely critical that I continue to develop and improve my media communication skills to become a more effective organizational communicator.
1. 276, “Public Affairs Scenario: Azerbaijan (SASO)”, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, reprint and publication as part of CGSC 2006, C100, Foundations Advance Sheets and Readings, (FT Leavenworth, Kansas, 2008).
2. Kenneth Payne, “The Media as an Instrument of War”, Parameters, US Army War College Quarterly, Volume XXXV, No. 1, (Spring 2005), 85, http://www.carlise.mil/usawc/Parameters/05spring/payne/pdf (accessed 13 August 2008).
MAJ JAMES H. MCLEAN
STUDENT, COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE, U.S. ARMY COMBINED ARMS CENTER, FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS.
See Command Policy #19-08, Combined Arms Center (CAC) Interactive Internet Activities for additional guidance.
The views expressed in this blog are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
Sunday, December 28, 2008
Monday, December 15, 2008
Integrity: The Hard Right vs. The Easy Left
Instilling the values that I hold true and practice in everyday life are critical to the success of any organization or small group. However, of all the values a good leader must possess, integrity is the most important because it transcends the size of any organization. I know because my integrity has been challenged in both a big a small organization.
I define integrity as choosing what is right even if it means losing a popularity contest with your subordinates. I have tested the definition of this value both as a company commander, responsible for 120 soldiers, and as a civil affairs team leader, in charge of three senior NCOs. In both situations, I have made decisions that, in the short run, were unpopular, but paid off dividends in the end. As a company commander, I was told by the Brigade Sergeants Major (SGM) that, by regulation, when soldiers go to the field, they must have their separate rations taken away; however, the SGM went on to say that “it was no big deal though…..all commanders on this post let their soldiers keep their separate rats”. After researching the regulation, I found that it was indeed true. I immediately enacted the paperwork to stop everyone’s separate rations before the next field problem. As a result, word spread around the brigade that I was taking money from soldiers. Senior NCOs and some officers pressured me to change this policy. I resisted, stating that this is the regulation and I must abide.
A couple of months after my policy correction, a no-notice inspection team from Ft Bragg, NC showed up at my brigade. Their mission was to inspect all administrative areas. The team went through every company leaving no rock left unturned. One of the “rocks” was rations paperwork for field problems. As a result, many of my fellow company commanders received counseling statements due to their negligence of the separate rations regulation. On the other hand, my company was recognized for correcting a systemic problem with separate rations throughout the brigade.
The principles of integrity also play a role on a team. As a team leader in charge of three senior NCOs in Afghanistan, I had the responsibility for small scale civic projects throughout a very remote province. At the time, only a handful of Coalition Forces were operating in this province. My team was given a lot of cash in order to contract for projects. Initially, we were given a lot of latitude in terms of what we kind of projects we could initiate with the money. As the Coalition command structure in the province matured over the last months of the tour, however, limitations on the scope of projects were imposed for oversight reasons.
In our last months in country, my team initiated a contract to build a school in a village that desperately needed a facility. My team developed quite a rapport with the local populace, many of whom were once Taliban. This project would aid the change in their perceptions of Americans. Unfortunately, just after the agreement had been with the local contractor, the Coalition refined the project guidance stating that schools could built only with funds that my team did not possess. Against the advise of my NCOs, I had no choice than to call off the project. There was no doubt the locals were upset and my men had lost confidence in me. My team sergeant told me that the school village was so far out in the “middle of nowhere” no one will ever know. Despite the pressures of my NCOs and the local populace, I knew that I made the right ethical choice.
Months later, after my team had redeployed, our project budget for Afghanistan was audited. I later found out that in response to large-scale abuse of project funds, the Coalition sent inspectors throughout the Afghani countryside to ensure money was spent properly. As a result, many officers and NCOs lost careers over misallocation of funds. My team, however, was spared. Taking the “hard right” is never easy, but have to deal with the potential implications of the “easy left” is worse.
As a company commander, I had to take money away from soldiers who were raised in an environment in which leaders did not want to make hard choices. As a team leader, I had to delay the effects of winning hearts and minds of the local populace and admiration of my NCOs to ensure project money allocation fell within regulation. In the end, however, keeping my integrity prevented soldiers from getting money taken out of their paychecks and senior NCOs from losing their careers. From these experiences and many others, not as dramatic, I have realized that integrity is a value that is hard maintain during struggling times, but it always pays dividends in the end.
I define integrity as choosing what is right even if it means losing a popularity contest with your subordinates. I have tested the definition of this value both as a company commander, responsible for 120 soldiers, and as a civil affairs team leader, in charge of three senior NCOs. In both situations, I have made decisions that, in the short run, were unpopular, but paid off dividends in the end. As a company commander, I was told by the Brigade Sergeants Major (SGM) that, by regulation, when soldiers go to the field, they must have their separate rations taken away; however, the SGM went on to say that “it was no big deal though…..all commanders on this post let their soldiers keep their separate rats”. After researching the regulation, I found that it was indeed true. I immediately enacted the paperwork to stop everyone’s separate rations before the next field problem. As a result, word spread around the brigade that I was taking money from soldiers. Senior NCOs and some officers pressured me to change this policy. I resisted, stating that this is the regulation and I must abide.
A couple of months after my policy correction, a no-notice inspection team from Ft Bragg, NC showed up at my brigade. Their mission was to inspect all administrative areas. The team went through every company leaving no rock left unturned. One of the “rocks” was rations paperwork for field problems. As a result, many of my fellow company commanders received counseling statements due to their negligence of the separate rations regulation. On the other hand, my company was recognized for correcting a systemic problem with separate rations throughout the brigade.
The principles of integrity also play a role on a team. As a team leader in charge of three senior NCOs in Afghanistan, I had the responsibility for small scale civic projects throughout a very remote province. At the time, only a handful of Coalition Forces were operating in this province. My team was given a lot of cash in order to contract for projects. Initially, we were given a lot of latitude in terms of what we kind of projects we could initiate with the money. As the Coalition command structure in the province matured over the last months of the tour, however, limitations on the scope of projects were imposed for oversight reasons.
In our last months in country, my team initiated a contract to build a school in a village that desperately needed a facility. My team developed quite a rapport with the local populace, many of whom were once Taliban. This project would aid the change in their perceptions of Americans. Unfortunately, just after the agreement had been with the local contractor, the Coalition refined the project guidance stating that schools could built only with funds that my team did not possess. Against the advise of my NCOs, I had no choice than to call off the project. There was no doubt the locals were upset and my men had lost confidence in me. My team sergeant told me that the school village was so far out in the “middle of nowhere” no one will ever know. Despite the pressures of my NCOs and the local populace, I knew that I made the right ethical choice.
Months later, after my team had redeployed, our project budget for Afghanistan was audited. I later found out that in response to large-scale abuse of project funds, the Coalition sent inspectors throughout the Afghani countryside to ensure money was spent properly. As a result, many officers and NCOs lost careers over misallocation of funds. My team, however, was spared. Taking the “hard right” is never easy, but have to deal with the potential implications of the “easy left” is worse.
As a company commander, I had to take money away from soldiers who were raised in an environment in which leaders did not want to make hard choices. As a team leader, I had to delay the effects of winning hearts and minds of the local populace and admiration of my NCOs to ensure project money allocation fell within regulation. In the end, however, keeping my integrity prevented soldiers from getting money taken out of their paychecks and senior NCOs from losing their careers. From these experiences and many others, not as dramatic, I have realized that integrity is a value that is hard maintain during struggling times, but it always pays dividends in the end.
This posting does not nessecarily reflect the official stance of the United States Army. This is my own work and reflects my opinion.
Friday, December 12, 2008
Tree Camaraderie
It started out like any other tasking in CGSC. All CGSC students were given the dubious task of completing STRATCOM requirements. One of the specific tasks of STRATCOM is to complete a community engagement. Most of us struggled with what to do in order to complete our community engagement. MAJ Thomas Laybourn had fortunately received a request from the Girls Scouts on Ft. Leavenworth to remove some dead trees from in front of the Hasting House. The Hasting House is a remodeled stable from the early days of Ft Leavenworth build in the1930s. The Hasting House is a historic building the Girl Scouts use to have their meetings. I knew about the building because my daughter is a Girl Scout.
After the offer was made by Tom we had to decide the best time to remove the trees. We went through an extensive military decision making process (MDMP) to identify the endstate, objectives and key task. After much deliberation, we decided on the appropriate weekend and meet at the PX on Ft Leavenworth.
There were about nine of us that volunteered our Saturday to help. We had some serious logging tools like axes, saws, rope and shovels--not to mention a Toyota Tundra truck for pulling. Once we arrived at the Hasting House we identified the five trees that needed to be removed, and went immediately to work. The first few trees we removed gave us the impression the task would be easy and we would make quick work of the remaining trees.
We chopped, pushed, and pulled trees that were about three to four inches thick in diameter. While we had success initially the last tree was not as cooperative. As we continued I began to ask myself how many Army Majors does it take to remove a tree? We obviously needed some expert help. It ended up taking an hour of chopping, digging, pushing, pulling on that one tree. What I did not mention was that we tied the begrudging tree to the aforementioned Toyota. Needless to say the tree won that round. Thank goodness, we did not pull the truck apart.
After several different approaches, techniques and deliberation about removing the tree we had an epiphany. We dug around the tree some more and found out there was still a live root at the base of the tree. It took about four or five good chops to remove stubborn root.
After our accomplishments we took a photo as proof of the obstinate tree. Proud of our accomplishments and ourselves we stood around and talked about class, deployments, future jobs, family and of course that last tree. We all felt a since of camaraderie and accomplishment you just do not get from conducting the awe inspiring MDMP.
We concluded with putting all the dirt back in the holes and having some cold beers as a well deserved reward. I look forward to the final phase of planting new trees in the spring. I’m sure we will have as much fun planting as we did pulling up the trees along with the since of satisfaction that we came together as a class and helped the community in the process. You always learn more about yourself and others when you work outside the confines of the classroom.
In conclusion, I had a great time tackling the project with my classmate and have the scars on my shoulders to prove it. We not only completed our community engagement for our STRATCOM requirement we all bonded and felt good about helping the community.
After the offer was made by Tom we had to decide the best time to remove the trees. We went through an extensive military decision making process (MDMP) to identify the endstate, objectives and key task. After much deliberation, we decided on the appropriate weekend and meet at the PX on Ft Leavenworth.
There were about nine of us that volunteered our Saturday to help. We had some serious logging tools like axes, saws, rope and shovels--not to mention a Toyota Tundra truck for pulling. Once we arrived at the Hasting House we identified the five trees that needed to be removed, and went immediately to work. The first few trees we removed gave us the impression the task would be easy and we would make quick work of the remaining trees.
We chopped, pushed, and pulled trees that were about three to four inches thick in diameter. While we had success initially the last tree was not as cooperative. As we continued I began to ask myself how many Army Majors does it take to remove a tree? We obviously needed some expert help. It ended up taking an hour of chopping, digging, pushing, pulling on that one tree. What I did not mention was that we tied the begrudging tree to the aforementioned Toyota. Needless to say the tree won that round. Thank goodness, we did not pull the truck apart.
After several different approaches, techniques and deliberation about removing the tree we had an epiphany. We dug around the tree some more and found out there was still a live root at the base of the tree. It took about four or five good chops to remove stubborn root.
After our accomplishments we took a photo as proof of the obstinate tree. Proud of our accomplishments and ourselves we stood around and talked about class, deployments, future jobs, family and of course that last tree. We all felt a since of camaraderie and accomplishment you just do not get from conducting the awe inspiring MDMP.
We concluded with putting all the dirt back in the holes and having some cold beers as a well deserved reward. I look forward to the final phase of planting new trees in the spring. I’m sure we will have as much fun planting as we did pulling up the trees along with the since of satisfaction that we came together as a class and helped the community in the process. You always learn more about yourself and others when you work outside the confines of the classroom.
In conclusion, I had a great time tackling the project with my classmate and have the scars on my shoulders to prove it. We not only completed our community engagement for our STRATCOM requirement we all bonded and felt good about helping the community.
Thursday, December 11, 2008
Modernizing the USAF--"Cutting Edge" or "Good Enough?"
by Maj Chris McMartin, USAF
NOTE: The following is the opinion of the author and does not necessarily reflect the views, policy, or opinion of the Department of Defense or United States Air Force.
The United States Air Force in its various incarnations has enjoyed a technological advantage over every other nation’s air arm practically since the dawn of powered flight. Since World War Two, this advantage has come at an increasing cost, to the point where in 2005 the Air Force was willing to reduce its personnel end strength by 40,000 Airmen, in part to justify the purchase of a few additional fighters.[i] It is imperative the incoming Presidential Administration reverse this trend. The Administration should opt instead to recapitalize the Air Force by purchasing “sufficient” advanced weapon systems instead of absolute cutting-edge technology. In doing so, the Air Force will be able to afford both more aircraft more often as well as more personnel. The effects will be reduced fatigue and operations tempo, and a more rapid technology deployment cycle to better keep up with changing threats.
The trend in spiraling costs for military aircraft is not new. Three decades ago, an Air Force major lamented the fact that, despite technology typically driving prices down (as in the case of automobiles), fighter aircraft cost eight times as much per pound by the 1970s as they did in World War Two—a cost increase six times as high as that for commercial aircraft.[ii] His suggestion was to pay several aircraft manufacturers an annual fee to develop new aircraft regularly, in order to keep development costs down. I suggest a different approach, more attuned to the computer age.
Moore’s Law from 1965 stipulates the number of transistors on a computer chip (and, by extension, computing power) doubles every 24 months. This hypothesis has proven true over the last 40-plus years.[iii] An end-user corollary is that no matter what computer a consumer buys, it will be obsolete in two years. This has led some industry pundits to advise consumers to purchase as much computer as they can possibly afford, so that it will not go obsolete as quickly as a cheaper (and presumably less-powerful) model. The consequence of such a decision is to hold on to that expensive computer as long as possible to “get the consumer’s money’s worth,” even though by the time it is finally retired it is several generations behind the current technology. The Air Force’s current inventory, which includes KC-135s and B-52s—both designs over 50 years old—seems to reflect this mentality.
However, a different school of thought posits that buying only sufficient computing power needed at the time is more efficient, as not only will the purchase be cheaper, the difference in price can be applied toward a more powerful model as the newer technology’s price decreases in the future. This concept can easily translate into military aircraft purchases.
A combination of superior technology and superior crew training gives the United States its decisive edge in air power. The technology advantage has typically been very large, though the Former Soviet Union made great strides in this respect during the 1980s and 1990s with their fourth- and fifth-generation fighters. Given the absence of this peer competitor, and the next peer competitor (China) still lagging in the technological realm, the Air Force needs simply to buy aircraft that are “good enough” to preserve a small, but still present, technological advantage. The cost savings realized by this approach would free up funds to allocate towards near-term future aircraft purchases, instead of being committed to maintaining outdated technology for a longer period of time.
Not only would this approach to aircraft procurement allow for more rapid “technology refreshes” than current practice; the reduced cost would provide funding for more individual aircraft as well as more personnel in the force. This would have a two-pronged effect.
First, the Air Force would be more flexible in that it could operate in more theaters simultaneously. Currently, because each type of aircraft costs so much (not just fighters, but support aircraft such as C-17s), fewer of each type are produced. An aircraft cannot be in two locations at once, so the lower numbers of aircraft must be prioritized as to which theater will receive their services (a prime example today is the “low density/high demand” concept evident in most ISR platforms). Having more aircraft available also means individual aircraft would not have to fly as many hours as they currently sustain, thereby increasing their service life. The War on Terror has already shortened the programmed service life of C-17s to the point that analysts say up to three times the originally-budgeted number of planes will be needed to sustain combat support operations.[iv]
Second, an addition in personnel end strength would reduce operations tempo. This year the Air Force announced a restructuring of its Aerospace Expeditionary Force (AEF) concept, which initially entailed a 1:4 dwell ratio (4 months deployed, 16 months at home station), to reflect the reality of many personnel in “stressed” career fields experiencing a 1:1 dwell (in some cases, 6 months deployed, 6 months at home station ad infinitum).[v] While the move was meant to better align the AEF cycle with joint planning constraints, it tacitly acknowledges the increasing operations tempo for career fields suffering a decline in their experienced personnel (for example, Security Forces) due to both voluntary and involuntary separations. Thankfully, Secretary of Defense put an end to the 40,000-troop force reduction in progress and proposed increasing end strength in the next few years.[vi] Future savings from buying sufficient rather than cutting-edge aircraft would enable the Air Force to build back up to previous personnel levels, helping to alleviate the pain in these stressed career fields.
Critics of this proposal to buy “good enough” vs. “absolute best” aircraft may worry about falling behind technologically. However, as previously mentioned, the Air Force’s advantage comes not only from superior equipment but superior training. General “Buster” Ellis, former commander 19th Air Force (Air Education and Training Command), extols the virtues of America’s superior pilot training—a combination of instructor ability and simulators.[vii]
The synergy offered by the combination of superior training and the proposed “sufficiently” advanced aircraft will maintain the United States Air Force’s combat edge and, more importantly, will allow for aircraft refresh cycles to be greatly reduced—clearly an advantage when working to counter an ever-changing threat scenario.
Military aircraft costs have increased too quickly for too long. The next Presidential Administration has a golden opportunity to reverse this trend and argue for sufficiency rather than cutting-edge technology for the next generation of aircraft. The savings realized can be immediately put to use in rejuvenating personnel end strength, reducing operations tempo in critical career fields, and purchasing more aircraft, extending service life for the entire fleet. In the long term, the ability to develop and field new aircraft using the savings from buying “good enough” aircraft now will pay dividends in allowing the Air Force to recapitalize its inventory more often to counter constantly changing adversaries worldwide.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[i] Wynne, Michael W. and General T. Michael Moseley. Air Force Posture Statement 2008, page 18.
[ii] Stark, Major Frederick T. “Why Military Airplanes Cost So Much and What Can Be Done About It.” Air University Review, Nov-Dec 1973.
[iii] “Moore’s Law—Made Real by Intel Innovation.” http://www.intel.com/technology/mooreslaw/; accessed 20 Oct 2008.
[iv] “Air Transportation” 17 April 2005. Strategy Page web site. http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htairmo/articles/20050417.aspx; accessed 20 Oct 2008.
[v] Wicke, TSgt Russell. “AEF Evolves for Stressed Career Fields.” Air Force Link, 02 June 2008. http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123101035; accessed 20 Oct 2008.
[vi] Randolph, SSgt Monique. “Air Force Charts New Course for 2009 Force Shaping.” Air Force Link, 12 June 2008. http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123102609; accessed 20 Oct 2008.
[vii] Miles, Donna. “Aircrew Training Ensures U.S. Air Superiority.” American Forces Press Service, 07 Sep 2004. http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=25383; accessed 20 Oct 2008.
NOTE: The following is the opinion of the author and does not necessarily reflect the views, policy, or opinion of the Department of Defense or United States Air Force.
The United States Air Force in its various incarnations has enjoyed a technological advantage over every other nation’s air arm practically since the dawn of powered flight. Since World War Two, this advantage has come at an increasing cost, to the point where in 2005 the Air Force was willing to reduce its personnel end strength by 40,000 Airmen, in part to justify the purchase of a few additional fighters.[i] It is imperative the incoming Presidential Administration reverse this trend. The Administration should opt instead to recapitalize the Air Force by purchasing “sufficient” advanced weapon systems instead of absolute cutting-edge technology. In doing so, the Air Force will be able to afford both more aircraft more often as well as more personnel. The effects will be reduced fatigue and operations tempo, and a more rapid technology deployment cycle to better keep up with changing threats.
The trend in spiraling costs for military aircraft is not new. Three decades ago, an Air Force major lamented the fact that, despite technology typically driving prices down (as in the case of automobiles), fighter aircraft cost eight times as much per pound by the 1970s as they did in World War Two—a cost increase six times as high as that for commercial aircraft.[ii] His suggestion was to pay several aircraft manufacturers an annual fee to develop new aircraft regularly, in order to keep development costs down. I suggest a different approach, more attuned to the computer age.
Moore’s Law from 1965 stipulates the number of transistors on a computer chip (and, by extension, computing power) doubles every 24 months. This hypothesis has proven true over the last 40-plus years.[iii] An end-user corollary is that no matter what computer a consumer buys, it will be obsolete in two years. This has led some industry pundits to advise consumers to purchase as much computer as they can possibly afford, so that it will not go obsolete as quickly as a cheaper (and presumably less-powerful) model. The consequence of such a decision is to hold on to that expensive computer as long as possible to “get the consumer’s money’s worth,” even though by the time it is finally retired it is several generations behind the current technology. The Air Force’s current inventory, which includes KC-135s and B-52s—both designs over 50 years old—seems to reflect this mentality.
However, a different school of thought posits that buying only sufficient computing power needed at the time is more efficient, as not only will the purchase be cheaper, the difference in price can be applied toward a more powerful model as the newer technology’s price decreases in the future. This concept can easily translate into military aircraft purchases.
A combination of superior technology and superior crew training gives the United States its decisive edge in air power. The technology advantage has typically been very large, though the Former Soviet Union made great strides in this respect during the 1980s and 1990s with their fourth- and fifth-generation fighters. Given the absence of this peer competitor, and the next peer competitor (China) still lagging in the technological realm, the Air Force needs simply to buy aircraft that are “good enough” to preserve a small, but still present, technological advantage. The cost savings realized by this approach would free up funds to allocate towards near-term future aircraft purchases, instead of being committed to maintaining outdated technology for a longer period of time.
Not only would this approach to aircraft procurement allow for more rapid “technology refreshes” than current practice; the reduced cost would provide funding for more individual aircraft as well as more personnel in the force. This would have a two-pronged effect.
First, the Air Force would be more flexible in that it could operate in more theaters simultaneously. Currently, because each type of aircraft costs so much (not just fighters, but support aircraft such as C-17s), fewer of each type are produced. An aircraft cannot be in two locations at once, so the lower numbers of aircraft must be prioritized as to which theater will receive their services (a prime example today is the “low density/high demand” concept evident in most ISR platforms). Having more aircraft available also means individual aircraft would not have to fly as many hours as they currently sustain, thereby increasing their service life. The War on Terror has already shortened the programmed service life of C-17s to the point that analysts say up to three times the originally-budgeted number of planes will be needed to sustain combat support operations.[iv]
Second, an addition in personnel end strength would reduce operations tempo. This year the Air Force announced a restructuring of its Aerospace Expeditionary Force (AEF) concept, which initially entailed a 1:4 dwell ratio (4 months deployed, 16 months at home station), to reflect the reality of many personnel in “stressed” career fields experiencing a 1:1 dwell (in some cases, 6 months deployed, 6 months at home station ad infinitum).[v] While the move was meant to better align the AEF cycle with joint planning constraints, it tacitly acknowledges the increasing operations tempo for career fields suffering a decline in their experienced personnel (for example, Security Forces) due to both voluntary and involuntary separations. Thankfully, Secretary of Defense put an end to the 40,000-troop force reduction in progress and proposed increasing end strength in the next few years.[vi] Future savings from buying sufficient rather than cutting-edge aircraft would enable the Air Force to build back up to previous personnel levels, helping to alleviate the pain in these stressed career fields.
Critics of this proposal to buy “good enough” vs. “absolute best” aircraft may worry about falling behind technologically. However, as previously mentioned, the Air Force’s advantage comes not only from superior equipment but superior training. General “Buster” Ellis, former commander 19th Air Force (Air Education and Training Command), extols the virtues of America’s superior pilot training—a combination of instructor ability and simulators.[vii]
The synergy offered by the combination of superior training and the proposed “sufficiently” advanced aircraft will maintain the United States Air Force’s combat edge and, more importantly, will allow for aircraft refresh cycles to be greatly reduced—clearly an advantage when working to counter an ever-changing threat scenario.
Military aircraft costs have increased too quickly for too long. The next Presidential Administration has a golden opportunity to reverse this trend and argue for sufficiency rather than cutting-edge technology for the next generation of aircraft. The savings realized can be immediately put to use in rejuvenating personnel end strength, reducing operations tempo in critical career fields, and purchasing more aircraft, extending service life for the entire fleet. In the long term, the ability to develop and field new aircraft using the savings from buying “good enough” aircraft now will pay dividends in allowing the Air Force to recapitalize its inventory more often to counter constantly changing adversaries worldwide.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[i] Wynne, Michael W. and General T. Michael Moseley. Air Force Posture Statement 2008, page 18.
[ii] Stark, Major Frederick T. “Why Military Airplanes Cost So Much and What Can Be Done About It.” Air University Review, Nov-Dec 1973.
[iii] “Moore’s Law—Made Real by Intel Innovation.” http://www.intel.com/technology/mooreslaw/; accessed 20 Oct 2008.
[iv] “Air Transportation” 17 April 2005. Strategy Page web site. http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htairmo/articles/20050417.aspx; accessed 20 Oct 2008.
[v] Wicke, TSgt Russell. “AEF Evolves for Stressed Career Fields.” Air Force Link, 02 June 2008. http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123101035; accessed 20 Oct 2008.
[vi] Randolph, SSgt Monique. “Air Force Charts New Course for 2009 Force Shaping.” Air Force Link, 12 June 2008. http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123102609; accessed 20 Oct 2008.
[vii] Miles, Donna. “Aircrew Training Ensures U.S. Air Superiority.” American Forces Press Service, 07 Sep 2004. http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=25383; accessed 20 Oct 2008.
Monday, November 24, 2008
In Remembrance,
In 2007, I received an email from Hero Bracelets asking those that had purchased the bracelets to write about why they wore them (bracelets). I wrote the following response while serving as Military Transition Team member in 2007-2008. I had worn the bracelet since I received it in 2005, but had never really thought about the events behind the name.
I am writing in response to the email that I received about those that have ordered the bracelets through your company. I would like to share my answer to that question. You also have my permission to reprint, use, or share it with any organization, person, or affiliation that is interested. I appreciate your efforts to recognize those individuals killed in the line of duty and hope that this letter finds your company and yourself well.
Why do I wear a bracelet, a simple circle with a name I have never met, a town I have never been to, and a date to which I can only tell you a soldier died on a battlefield? I received your hero bracelet after I returned from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF II) in March of 2005. I never really thought about why I wore it but I can tell you that I still wear the same bracelet that I received from your organization. I wear it because I never knew PVT Matthew D. Bush, but I sweat, bleed, and think about home like PVT Matthew D. Bush. I miss the taste of freedom while I eat the same meals as him. I do not know what he would think of this war, nearly four years later. Would he be proud to say that he was there at the beginning and tried his best to make this place better? Or would he quietly walk down your street and never mention those months he spent here. I wear it because in wearing it I honor his commitment, courage, and sacrifice in a place that sometimes does not remember it. I wear it because if the same fate should happen to me, I would hope someone would remember my name. I wear it because as Winston Churchill said “We make a living by what we get, we make a life by what we give.”
His life for our freedom, rest in peace Matthew D. Bush.
And now for the rest of the story…I received an email from PVT Bush’s father shortly after sending my response to the website. We corresponded about the life of his son and his unfortunate death. Matthew followed the tradition of his father who served in Vietnam and served with the 101st ABN DIV (AASLT). Mr. Bush’s love and devotion for his son’s sacrifice could be felt throughout the conversations. I still wear the bracelet, but have a much deeper connection to the name and story behind it. His sister also joined the 101st ABN DIV, but we never had the chance to meet before I departed for home. I have left Iraq but its effect will never leave any of us that have been there.
The web site has some powerful stories, one which is heartbreaking. There is one particular story that I still remember called "The Boots". It is the heartache that I heard in Mr. Bush’s voice and letters. Attached is the website to the story, powerful stuff.
http://herobracelets.org/?p=253
Take care Matthew, you are not forgotten. I remember.
v/r,
MAJ JACKIE K. KAINA
STUDENT, COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
U.S. ARMY COMBINED ARMS CENTER, FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS
See Command Policy #19-08, Combined Arms Center (CAC) Interactive Internet Activities for additional guidance.
The views expressed in this blog are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
In 2007, I received an email from Hero Bracelets asking those that had purchased the bracelets to write about why they wore them (bracelets). I wrote the following response while serving as Military Transition Team member in 2007-2008. I had worn the bracelet since I received it in 2005, but had never really thought about the events behind the name.
I am writing in response to the email that I received about those that have ordered the bracelets through your company. I would like to share my answer to that question. You also have my permission to reprint, use, or share it with any organization, person, or affiliation that is interested. I appreciate your efforts to recognize those individuals killed in the line of duty and hope that this letter finds your company and yourself well.
Why do I wear a bracelet, a simple circle with a name I have never met, a town I have never been to, and a date to which I can only tell you a soldier died on a battlefield? I received your hero bracelet after I returned from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF II) in March of 2005. I never really thought about why I wore it but I can tell you that I still wear the same bracelet that I received from your organization. I wear it because I never knew PVT Matthew D. Bush, but I sweat, bleed, and think about home like PVT Matthew D. Bush. I miss the taste of freedom while I eat the same meals as him. I do not know what he would think of this war, nearly four years later. Would he be proud to say that he was there at the beginning and tried his best to make this place better? Or would he quietly walk down your street and never mention those months he spent here. I wear it because in wearing it I honor his commitment, courage, and sacrifice in a place that sometimes does not remember it. I wear it because if the same fate should happen to me, I would hope someone would remember my name. I wear it because as Winston Churchill said “We make a living by what we get, we make a life by what we give.”
His life for our freedom, rest in peace Matthew D. Bush.
And now for the rest of the story…I received an email from PVT Bush’s father shortly after sending my response to the website. We corresponded about the life of his son and his unfortunate death. Matthew followed the tradition of his father who served in Vietnam and served with the 101st ABN DIV (AASLT). Mr. Bush’s love and devotion for his son’s sacrifice could be felt throughout the conversations. I still wear the bracelet, but have a much deeper connection to the name and story behind it. His sister also joined the 101st ABN DIV, but we never had the chance to meet before I departed for home. I have left Iraq but its effect will never leave any of us that have been there.
The web site has some powerful stories, one which is heartbreaking. There is one particular story that I still remember called "The Boots". It is the heartache that I heard in Mr. Bush’s voice and letters. Attached is the website to the story, powerful stuff.
http://herobracelets.org/?p=253
Take care Matthew, you are not forgotten. I remember.
v/r,
MAJ JACKIE K. KAINA
STUDENT, COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
U.S. ARMY COMBINED ARMS CENTER, FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS
See Command Policy #19-08, Combined Arms Center (CAC) Interactive Internet Activities for additional guidance.
The views expressed in this blog are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
Tuesday, September 16, 2008
Major Thomas E. Laybourn CGSC Student, Section 18C
An adage exists in the military which is unfortunately very accurate: “we train for the war we just fought.” Though in many aspects our Army has made tremendous advances tactically and technologically, one area that is very much neglected is cultural understanding of the nation or group whom we plan on fighting. For decades, the unwritten tactical rule advocated using firepower, maneuver, and protection to defeat enemies. This concept was very much a product of our past campaigns with industrialized nations (like Germany or Japan) and the threat of war with the Soviet Union or Communist China. Being able to talk to the enemy or their civilians was tangentially addressed but never viewed as a priority for all but a few very specialized units. An ability to speak with and understand the enemy didn’t matter… they would be killed. This heavy handed concept has been reexamined because of the guerrilla nature of the Global War on Terrorism. The change in operations was certainly an emergent change or a change which gradually developed out of necessity (Jick, 2003, p.16). Though our tactics have altered to better face our present enemy, specifically the terrorists in Iraq and Afghanistan, our focus on linguistics and cultural awareness is still negligible. For most maneuver units, training timelines are very condensed given the frequency of deployments. This forces commanders to focus their limited time and resources on essential training tasks and events; live fire exercises, medical training, and marksmanship. For many commanders, the emphasis on tangible results justifies a program which puts linguistics and cultural awareness on the back burner. Often, if it is trained on, it is only addressed as a “check the block” event, where minimal effort is applied. In fairness, one must acknowledge that some effort has been made by the Army and commanders to give units a minimal level of cultural understanding. Often, units will identify one or two Soldiers out of every 40 to attend a week long language course, and annually all Soldiers are given cultural awareness classes on Middle Eastern Culture; these classes normally take two to three days depending on the program. Though some attempt has been made to address language training and cultural education, the end result is mediocre for most units. Frequently, Soldiers learn about the culture they are going to be facing once they are in the theater of operations they have deployed to.
Unfortunately, by the time a Soldier learns enough of the language to be effective, or the nuances of cultural etiquette, it is several months into the deployment and valuable time has been wasted. To adequately leverage language and cultural sensitivity as a tool on the modern battlefield requires a greater exposure for our Soldiers to the language of the enemy they will be facing. To accommodate this exposure will require a change in how our units do business in garrison environments.
For most indigenous people, including those in Iraq and Afghanistan, active warfare is limited to a very small part of their population. The vast majority of the population will probably be indifferent to the campaign one way or the other. Though the population as a whole may passively support the insurgents or guerrillas, they mostly attempt to keep to their own lives unless acted on in a negative manner. A civilian will certainly know who the insurgents are in his area but will not feel compelled identify them unless he connects with the invader more than he does his insurgent neighbor. For this reason the value in understanding the indigenous culture for an invading Army is profound. Paramount in this understanding of culture is being able to speak the language of the indigenous population. A study made during the Vietnam war found that “all field advisors interviewed who had some mastery of Vietnamese had found it an invaluable asset” (Ramsey, 2006, p.152). True understanding of a culture requires immersion in many lengthy classes, however, a relatively benign technique for interacting with civilians of a different culture is conversation. It must be acknowledged that learning a different language, like cultural awareness, is remarkably challenging and requires a great deal of time to become proficient for most people. However, a rudimentary understanding can be arrived at with relatively little effort. As a cultural tool, communications can help endear indigenous persons to our Soldiers as well as enable better gathering of intelligence on the battlefield. Though interpreters do exist, they are not abundant enough to be present on every patrol. Without an ability to communicate it is challenging for Soldiers to differentiate from sadiki (friends) and enemy. Interpreters drawn from the local population may also have ulterior motives and seek to deceive their American employers. Therefore, an ability to communicate, even at an elementary level, is as important to a Soldier as having enough bullets… perhaps more so.
Interestingly, our Army has a tremendous amount of institutional knowledge concerning successful execution of guerrilla campaigns and the effectiveness of cultural understanding at the Soldier level. Our nation’s military history is actually filled with numerous campaigns with guerilla elements, which Kipling refers to as “savage wars of peace” (Karshtedt, 2006, para. 5). These wars, aimed at quelling rebellions or insurgencies, fostered a great deal of educational movement at the Soldier level within the Army. With one campaign in particular, the Philippine Insurrection, the effectiveness of units quelling rebellious “insurrectos” was generally related to a unit’s ability to interact with the local populace in a civil way.
The Taft administration encouraged a policy known as “benevolent assimilation” for the territories that were gained from the war with Spain, including the Philippine Islands. The concept revolved around the feeling that the native peoples of these new territories would become Americanized and ultimately benefit from the advances made in our industrialized culture (Linn, 2002). Ironically, Americans found that in their quest to Americanize the Philippines, they had to gain a better understanding of the culture and the language of the natives. To encourage the Phillipino people to transition required significant communications skills at the Soldier level. Without a basic understanding of their culture and language the assimilation could only occur through violence.
Though revisionist academic culture has sought to paint the American campaigns in the Philippines as brutal and oppressive, the United States was successful in that campaign because of their willingness to assist the civilian population peacefully. Interestingly, in the case of the Philippines, a logistical peculiarity enhanced the American campaign. Units that fought in the Philippine Islands came from posts (forts) or states that were west of the Mississippi River, especially the Southwest. In these regions of the United States, even in 1900, Spanish was widely understood. Apart from tremendous tactical experience fighting guerilla wars against the American Indians, Soldiers heading to the Philippines often had the ability to communicate with the merchant and land owning castes in the Philippines, as these elements spoke Spanish rather than other native dialects.
In contrast to successes, many cases of failed campaigning came from arrogant alienation of the local populace by the occupying forces. One incident in particular resulted in dreadful casualties for both sides on the island of Samar. Marines and Soldiers garrisoning the towns on the island were especially brutal and made no attempt to interact with the local population. In an arrogant disregard for the guidance of “benevolent assimilation” American forces on Samar conducted their patrols most violently and expected the locals to adopt the customs of the Americans unconditionally. The result was a lengthy guerilla campaign recognized more for destruction than any attempt to help the native people. Furthermore, the violence caused a sense of alienation
which encouraged the civilians to support the guerillas without question and rise up in open rebellion (Linn, 2002).
Similar patterns, successful and unsuccessful, have been observed in more recent American campaigns in Korea, El Salvador and Vietnam. “Developing rapport was just the beginning,” says Ramsey of advisors during the Vietnam War, and key to building rapport with a foreign people is speaking their language and understanding their customs (Ramsey, 2006, p. 50).
Recently, another example of cultural and linguistic knowledge augmenting tactical success occurred in Iraq. After the much advertised troop surge, which placed an additional 30,000 American troops in Iraq, succeeded in reducing violence, a peculiar transformation began to develop in many regions of that nation. Local populations actively sought out Americans on patrol in order to give them information on insurgents. This metamorphosis did not happen over night. The Army as a whole has inadvertently incorporated cultural knowledge into its units as a result of its extended experience in Iraq. But not all units had an abundance of veterans to leverage cultural knowledge. One relatively new unit has had a great deal of success in no small part because of the cultural training they received prior to their deployment. This unit is C Troop of the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment, known as “Comanche” Troop. Comanche troop was built from scratch from October 2005 and deployed to Iraq in early February of 2007.
With just over a year to prepare, the Comanche Troopers, most of whom were new Soldiers to the Army, were subjected to a very strenuous training program similar to every other unit in their division and even in the Army as a whole. Their training differed in that they had a regular linguistic training regiment as well as Arabic cultural reinforcements in all their training events. Every Soldier in their 80 man troop was enrolled in a language program called Rosetta Stone. Additionally, every Soldier in the troop was provided with Arabic language pamphlets and workbooks already developed by the Army. The emphasis on language was also integrated into training exercises where Soldiers role played as enemy or practiced their language skills as friendly forces. The training regiment was incorporated into everyday garrison life and made Arabic linguistics seem, in some part, second nature. When Comanche Troop participated in a set of maneuvers at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, which employs hundreds of Arabic speakers who serve as role players, the feedback from cadre and roll players alike was extremely positive; the Comanches held an elementary understanding of the Arabic language even at the lowest level. C Troop had effectively incorporated knowledge of Arabic into their unit and employed it as a tool.
The real validation for the Comanches came months later after they had deployed to Iraq. In the East Rashid district of Baghdad, part of a volatile area known as Dora, the Comanches and their comrades from 1-4 Cavalry had many tough fights. However, their determined application of census patrols, with active interaction with the local Iraqis, eventually won over the indigenous population and increased the level of HUMINT (Human Intelligence) gathered on each patrol. During census patrols, groups of ten to fifteen Soldiers move by foot or truck to some predetermined group of homes in their zone. Once there, they go to each home, enter and take a census of the family; names, occupation, how their electricity or other civic needs are being met, etc…
The Comanches had been trained on the importance of courtesy prior to the deployment as well as peculiarities of Arab culture. A training team was coordinated for and visited Comanche Troop and their Squadron on two occasions as well as another cultural awareness seminar while at Fort Irwin. When Soldiers would enter Iraqi homes it was more like a casual visit with friends, and their passing ability to communicate in Arabic established positive relationships with many Iraqis who had become jaded from years of violence that appeared interminable. The local Iraqis became so comfortable with the Americans that they would invite the Comanches in for tea, or supper which is customary in Iraqi culture for guests. During these visits, Soldiers would practice their elementary Arabic and break the ice with the Iraqis establishing the foundation for acceptance as well as gathering valuable information about their zone. Additionally, the inhabitants of the Comanches’ zone began to have positive associations with the Americans and even developed close friendships with Soldiers.
Fortunately, the cultural education the Soldiers received before the deployment prepared them for potentially awkward situations that arose from friendly interaction with Arabs. One humorous event involved SFC Scott Hanzich, a Platoon Sergeant in Comanche troop. SFC Hanzich had been taught about the frequency with which Arabs touch members of the same sex. As McShane points out, “nonverbal communication is more important in some cultures than others” (McShane, 2008, p.325). The nonverbal communication of touching hands or hugging shows great respect in Arab culture. SFC Hanzich befriended an Iraqi Police Lieutenant who insisted on closer contact than would be culturally acceptable in the United States. Though he privately endured the good natured ridicule of his peers, he knew that the Iraqi was simply showing friendship rather than making obscene advances. “If I had not known about their touchy-feely ways I would have punched this guy,” recalled Hanzich (Hanzich, 2007). Now, the Iraqis and the Americans are actively working together and have a greater feeling of friendship and cooperation. This transformation not only alienated the terrorists but has caused a dramatic decrease in attacks and an increase in insurgents captured after being exposed by their neighbors.
Acknowledging that language and cultural understanding are valuable tools is easy for any commander. However, implementing a plan for training which incorporates language and culture into every day is more challenging. Sending troops away to lengthy language courses is impractical and costly. Furthermore, if too much effort is placed on linguistics and not enough on other essential tasks the Army would be filled with thousands of Arabic speakers who cannot shoot or render first aid! Advertising this vision for change within a unit will require some commitment from the chain of command because as Jick and Peiperl state “to make change successful, some picture of the desired future state- vision- is essential” (Jick, 2003, p.92). Fortunately, tools exist already which can enable a commander to keep linguistics a priority in their units without hampering other mission essential training events:
Rosetta Stone: the Army has a contract with the Rosetta Stone Language Company and their language software is available on the Army Knowledge Online website for use by any Soldier. Enrolling is simple and using the program is very easy. The benefit of this system is that upon completion of a lesson the Soldier receives a certificate. This certificate validates that they are doing their homework and is also worth college credit at many institutions!
Additionally, each lesson can be completed in four hours. Since the lessons are broken down into ten portions, it does not require an abundance of time for the Soldier and can easily be completed during the day. Requiring a certificate at the end of each month is realistic even for the most academically challenged. As there will certainly be resistance from many of the Soldiers, advertising the benefits of the program will help internalize the action. Posting a stated vision for the program is one technique that has great value and has been used in the Army as well as the civilian sector (Jick, 2003).
Defense Language Institute Arabic Language Survival Guide: The Army has published a very practical and user friendly pamphlet which has essential phrases in it for any Soldier during a campaign. Distribution of these documents months prior to a deployment will enable Soldiers to familiarize themselves with them and use them as a reference when studying on Rosetta Stone or other language mediums. Though some commanders may be hesitant to distribute these resources as some Soldiers will loose them, it is advisable nonetheless. Creativity can easily be applied to ensure troops keep this reference on their persons by making it mandatory or punishing those who loose these documents.
Kwikpoint Reference Cards: The Kwikpoint reference cards, which have pictures of actions and things along with English and Arabic translations enable Soldiers with even the most elementary language skill to be able to communicate with the locals. Distribute these long before the deployment and order more for surplus. Being familiar with these cards can enable any Soldier to communicate, even if they have no understanding of Arabic whatsoever!
Cultural Training: Every major installation in the Army has access to Middle Eastern Cultural Training Teams who are available for educating Soldiers. Normally, installations and units incorporate these teams to train their elements over a two or three day period prior to a deployment. Increasing the frequency of these training visits to once a quarter as opposed to once annually will improve the individual Soldier’s appreciation for the culture in which he is going to be exposed. This appreciation, though it may not be genuine, can at least cultivate an understanding and prevent negative perceptions which can quickly alienate Soldiers from the civilians they need to interact with.
Find a validation exercise: Posted visions and active training will certainly have positive benefits for to ingraining the language skills in one’s Soldiers. However, witnessing the benefits firsthand reinforce the value of language skills and encourage troops to learn more about the culture in which they are going to be immersed. The National Training Center as well as the Joint Readiness Training Center both have extensive numbers of Arabic speaking role players. This will be the best opportunity for a unit to validate their language and cultural skills, as every unit must participate in one of these maneuvers prior to deploying to Iraq. For the Soldiers, they will see first hand that even a rudimentary skill with the foreign tongue will assist their patrols greatly.
Ultimately, the need to incorporate linguistics training and cultural sensitivity is imperative for the success of our Army in any campaign. Though our current conflict compels our troops to focus on the languages of the Middle East, like Arabic and Pashto, a systemic approach to language training using existing tools can augment our Army’s ability regardless of what nation or culture in which we are required to fight. Use of cultural awareness training teams, language pamphlets, quick reference guides and computer programs like Rosetta Stone give commanders an easy method for tracking their unit’s language proficiency, and can provide them metrics when they attend maneuvers at any of our training centers. In the end, the success of foreign language skills and cultural understanding manifests itself in combat. For in an environment as unforgiving as war, an ability to understand a warning given in a foreign tongue can mean the difference between life and death.
This posting does not nessecarily reflect the official stance of the United States Army. This is my own work and reflects my opinion. Thomas E. Laybourn, 16SEP08
Unfortunately, by the time a Soldier learns enough of the language to be effective, or the nuances of cultural etiquette, it is several months into the deployment and valuable time has been wasted. To adequately leverage language and cultural sensitivity as a tool on the modern battlefield requires a greater exposure for our Soldiers to the language of the enemy they will be facing. To accommodate this exposure will require a change in how our units do business in garrison environments.
For most indigenous people, including those in Iraq and Afghanistan, active warfare is limited to a very small part of their population. The vast majority of the population will probably be indifferent to the campaign one way or the other. Though the population as a whole may passively support the insurgents or guerrillas, they mostly attempt to keep to their own lives unless acted on in a negative manner. A civilian will certainly know who the insurgents are in his area but will not feel compelled identify them unless he connects with the invader more than he does his insurgent neighbor. For this reason the value in understanding the indigenous culture for an invading Army is profound. Paramount in this understanding of culture is being able to speak the language of the indigenous population. A study made during the Vietnam war found that “all field advisors interviewed who had some mastery of Vietnamese had found it an invaluable asset” (Ramsey, 2006, p.152). True understanding of a culture requires immersion in many lengthy classes, however, a relatively benign technique for interacting with civilians of a different culture is conversation. It must be acknowledged that learning a different language, like cultural awareness, is remarkably challenging and requires a great deal of time to become proficient for most people. However, a rudimentary understanding can be arrived at with relatively little effort. As a cultural tool, communications can help endear indigenous persons to our Soldiers as well as enable better gathering of intelligence on the battlefield. Though interpreters do exist, they are not abundant enough to be present on every patrol. Without an ability to communicate it is challenging for Soldiers to differentiate from sadiki (friends) and enemy. Interpreters drawn from the local population may also have ulterior motives and seek to deceive their American employers. Therefore, an ability to communicate, even at an elementary level, is as important to a Soldier as having enough bullets… perhaps more so.
Interestingly, our Army has a tremendous amount of institutional knowledge concerning successful execution of guerrilla campaigns and the effectiveness of cultural understanding at the Soldier level. Our nation’s military history is actually filled with numerous campaigns with guerilla elements, which Kipling refers to as “savage wars of peace” (Karshtedt, 2006, para. 5). These wars, aimed at quelling rebellions or insurgencies, fostered a great deal of educational movement at the Soldier level within the Army. With one campaign in particular, the Philippine Insurrection, the effectiveness of units quelling rebellious “insurrectos” was generally related to a unit’s ability to interact with the local populace in a civil way.
The Taft administration encouraged a policy known as “benevolent assimilation” for the territories that were gained from the war with Spain, including the Philippine Islands. The concept revolved around the feeling that the native peoples of these new territories would become Americanized and ultimately benefit from the advances made in our industrialized culture (Linn, 2002). Ironically, Americans found that in their quest to Americanize the Philippines, they had to gain a better understanding of the culture and the language of the natives. To encourage the Phillipino people to transition required significant communications skills at the Soldier level. Without a basic understanding of their culture and language the assimilation could only occur through violence.
Though revisionist academic culture has sought to paint the American campaigns in the Philippines as brutal and oppressive, the United States was successful in that campaign because of their willingness to assist the civilian population peacefully. Interestingly, in the case of the Philippines, a logistical peculiarity enhanced the American campaign. Units that fought in the Philippine Islands came from posts (forts) or states that were west of the Mississippi River, especially the Southwest. In these regions of the United States, even in 1900, Spanish was widely understood. Apart from tremendous tactical experience fighting guerilla wars against the American Indians, Soldiers heading to the Philippines often had the ability to communicate with the merchant and land owning castes in the Philippines, as these elements spoke Spanish rather than other native dialects.
In contrast to successes, many cases of failed campaigning came from arrogant alienation of the local populace by the occupying forces. One incident in particular resulted in dreadful casualties for both sides on the island of Samar. Marines and Soldiers garrisoning the towns on the island were especially brutal and made no attempt to interact with the local population. In an arrogant disregard for the guidance of “benevolent assimilation” American forces on Samar conducted their patrols most violently and expected the locals to adopt the customs of the Americans unconditionally. The result was a lengthy guerilla campaign recognized more for destruction than any attempt to help the native people. Furthermore, the violence caused a sense of alienation
which encouraged the civilians to support the guerillas without question and rise up in open rebellion (Linn, 2002).
Similar patterns, successful and unsuccessful, have been observed in more recent American campaigns in Korea, El Salvador and Vietnam. “Developing rapport was just the beginning,” says Ramsey of advisors during the Vietnam War, and key to building rapport with a foreign people is speaking their language and understanding their customs (Ramsey, 2006, p. 50).
Recently, another example of cultural and linguistic knowledge augmenting tactical success occurred in Iraq. After the much advertised troop surge, which placed an additional 30,000 American troops in Iraq, succeeded in reducing violence, a peculiar transformation began to develop in many regions of that nation. Local populations actively sought out Americans on patrol in order to give them information on insurgents. This metamorphosis did not happen over night. The Army as a whole has inadvertently incorporated cultural knowledge into its units as a result of its extended experience in Iraq. But not all units had an abundance of veterans to leverage cultural knowledge. One relatively new unit has had a great deal of success in no small part because of the cultural training they received prior to their deployment. This unit is C Troop of the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment, known as “Comanche” Troop. Comanche troop was built from scratch from October 2005 and deployed to Iraq in early February of 2007.
With just over a year to prepare, the Comanche Troopers, most of whom were new Soldiers to the Army, were subjected to a very strenuous training program similar to every other unit in their division and even in the Army as a whole. Their training differed in that they had a regular linguistic training regiment as well as Arabic cultural reinforcements in all their training events. Every Soldier in their 80 man troop was enrolled in a language program called Rosetta Stone. Additionally, every Soldier in the troop was provided with Arabic language pamphlets and workbooks already developed by the Army. The emphasis on language was also integrated into training exercises where Soldiers role played as enemy or practiced their language skills as friendly forces. The training regiment was incorporated into everyday garrison life and made Arabic linguistics seem, in some part, second nature. When Comanche Troop participated in a set of maneuvers at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, which employs hundreds of Arabic speakers who serve as role players, the feedback from cadre and roll players alike was extremely positive; the Comanches held an elementary understanding of the Arabic language even at the lowest level. C Troop had effectively incorporated knowledge of Arabic into their unit and employed it as a tool.
The real validation for the Comanches came months later after they had deployed to Iraq. In the East Rashid district of Baghdad, part of a volatile area known as Dora, the Comanches and their comrades from 1-4 Cavalry had many tough fights. However, their determined application of census patrols, with active interaction with the local Iraqis, eventually won over the indigenous population and increased the level of HUMINT (Human Intelligence) gathered on each patrol. During census patrols, groups of ten to fifteen Soldiers move by foot or truck to some predetermined group of homes in their zone. Once there, they go to each home, enter and take a census of the family; names, occupation, how their electricity or other civic needs are being met, etc…
The Comanches had been trained on the importance of courtesy prior to the deployment as well as peculiarities of Arab culture. A training team was coordinated for and visited Comanche Troop and their Squadron on two occasions as well as another cultural awareness seminar while at Fort Irwin. When Soldiers would enter Iraqi homes it was more like a casual visit with friends, and their passing ability to communicate in Arabic established positive relationships with many Iraqis who had become jaded from years of violence that appeared interminable. The local Iraqis became so comfortable with the Americans that they would invite the Comanches in for tea, or supper which is customary in Iraqi culture for guests. During these visits, Soldiers would practice their elementary Arabic and break the ice with the Iraqis establishing the foundation for acceptance as well as gathering valuable information about their zone. Additionally, the inhabitants of the Comanches’ zone began to have positive associations with the Americans and even developed close friendships with Soldiers.
Fortunately, the cultural education the Soldiers received before the deployment prepared them for potentially awkward situations that arose from friendly interaction with Arabs. One humorous event involved SFC Scott Hanzich, a Platoon Sergeant in Comanche troop. SFC Hanzich had been taught about the frequency with which Arabs touch members of the same sex. As McShane points out, “nonverbal communication is more important in some cultures than others” (McShane, 2008, p.325). The nonverbal communication of touching hands or hugging shows great respect in Arab culture. SFC Hanzich befriended an Iraqi Police Lieutenant who insisted on closer contact than would be culturally acceptable in the United States. Though he privately endured the good natured ridicule of his peers, he knew that the Iraqi was simply showing friendship rather than making obscene advances. “If I had not known about their touchy-feely ways I would have punched this guy,” recalled Hanzich (Hanzich, 2007). Now, the Iraqis and the Americans are actively working together and have a greater feeling of friendship and cooperation. This transformation not only alienated the terrorists but has caused a dramatic decrease in attacks and an increase in insurgents captured after being exposed by their neighbors.
Acknowledging that language and cultural understanding are valuable tools is easy for any commander. However, implementing a plan for training which incorporates language and culture into every day is more challenging. Sending troops away to lengthy language courses is impractical and costly. Furthermore, if too much effort is placed on linguistics and not enough on other essential tasks the Army would be filled with thousands of Arabic speakers who cannot shoot or render first aid! Advertising this vision for change within a unit will require some commitment from the chain of command because as Jick and Peiperl state “to make change successful, some picture of the desired future state- vision- is essential” (Jick, 2003, p.92). Fortunately, tools exist already which can enable a commander to keep linguistics a priority in their units without hampering other mission essential training events:
Rosetta Stone: the Army has a contract with the Rosetta Stone Language Company and their language software is available on the Army Knowledge Online website for use by any Soldier. Enrolling is simple and using the program is very easy. The benefit of this system is that upon completion of a lesson the Soldier receives a certificate. This certificate validates that they are doing their homework and is also worth college credit at many institutions!
Additionally, each lesson can be completed in four hours. Since the lessons are broken down into ten portions, it does not require an abundance of time for the Soldier and can easily be completed during the day. Requiring a certificate at the end of each month is realistic even for the most academically challenged. As there will certainly be resistance from many of the Soldiers, advertising the benefits of the program will help internalize the action. Posting a stated vision for the program is one technique that has great value and has been used in the Army as well as the civilian sector (Jick, 2003).
Defense Language Institute Arabic Language Survival Guide: The Army has published a very practical and user friendly pamphlet which has essential phrases in it for any Soldier during a campaign. Distribution of these documents months prior to a deployment will enable Soldiers to familiarize themselves with them and use them as a reference when studying on Rosetta Stone or other language mediums. Though some commanders may be hesitant to distribute these resources as some Soldiers will loose them, it is advisable nonetheless. Creativity can easily be applied to ensure troops keep this reference on their persons by making it mandatory or punishing those who loose these documents.
Kwikpoint Reference Cards: The Kwikpoint reference cards, which have pictures of actions and things along with English and Arabic translations enable Soldiers with even the most elementary language skill to be able to communicate with the locals. Distribute these long before the deployment and order more for surplus. Being familiar with these cards can enable any Soldier to communicate, even if they have no understanding of Arabic whatsoever!
Cultural Training: Every major installation in the Army has access to Middle Eastern Cultural Training Teams who are available for educating Soldiers. Normally, installations and units incorporate these teams to train their elements over a two or three day period prior to a deployment. Increasing the frequency of these training visits to once a quarter as opposed to once annually will improve the individual Soldier’s appreciation for the culture in which he is going to be exposed. This appreciation, though it may not be genuine, can at least cultivate an understanding and prevent negative perceptions which can quickly alienate Soldiers from the civilians they need to interact with.
Find a validation exercise: Posted visions and active training will certainly have positive benefits for to ingraining the language skills in one’s Soldiers. However, witnessing the benefits firsthand reinforce the value of language skills and encourage troops to learn more about the culture in which they are going to be immersed. The National Training Center as well as the Joint Readiness Training Center both have extensive numbers of Arabic speaking role players. This will be the best opportunity for a unit to validate their language and cultural skills, as every unit must participate in one of these maneuvers prior to deploying to Iraq. For the Soldiers, they will see first hand that even a rudimentary skill with the foreign tongue will assist their patrols greatly.
Ultimately, the need to incorporate linguistics training and cultural sensitivity is imperative for the success of our Army in any campaign. Though our current conflict compels our troops to focus on the languages of the Middle East, like Arabic and Pashto, a systemic approach to language training using existing tools can augment our Army’s ability regardless of what nation or culture in which we are required to fight. Use of cultural awareness training teams, language pamphlets, quick reference guides and computer programs like Rosetta Stone give commanders an easy method for tracking their unit’s language proficiency, and can provide them metrics when they attend maneuvers at any of our training centers. In the end, the success of foreign language skills and cultural understanding manifests itself in combat. For in an environment as unforgiving as war, an ability to understand a warning given in a foreign tongue can mean the difference between life and death.
This posting does not nessecarily reflect the official stance of the United States Army. This is my own work and reflects my opinion. Thomas E. Laybourn, 16SEP08
Friday, September 12, 2008
MAJ Brad Martin's Blog
The Most Significant Day of My Military Career
Major Brad K. Martin, Student, Command and General Staff College,
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Over the course of my career, there have been several significant days. The first day as a brand new Second Lieutenant in my platoon, taking Company Command and crossing the border of Kuwait and Iraq heading towards Baghdad are a few of those significant days. However, it was a handshake and a picture during a clothes drive in Kosovo that is the most significant day of my military career.
From May 2002-November 2002, I was in command of my company and deployed to Kosovo. In preparation for the deployment, we conducted all of the necessary train-up, and were briefed that our primary role there would be as peacekeepers. As a military police officer, I knew that my company, and I, would be spending a great deal of time out on the roads, conducting area security and police intelligence operations. I knew this would put us out in the cities and villages, and we would be talking with people of all ethnic and religious backgrounds. I also knew that we would take part in helping to train a former Albanian Infantry unit that was changing into a Search and Rescue unit.
Knowing what our mission was and what our day to day business was going to entail, I began to think of different ways that we could bridge the gap between the different ethnicities we would encounter. I knew that it would be impossible to change their culture, but I knew that it was possible to have a positive effect on those that we encountered, and that possibly, through our efforts, we could bring some people together to share in a common good. After much thought, I decided that a clothes drive would be a mission that could help us in this effort.
At the time, I was stationed in Germany, so I began to coordinate with several Provost Marshal Offices across Germany to place clothes drop boxes in their offices. I also coordinated with the Garrison Commander’s Office in several Base Support Battalions across Germany to get the word out to the communities about the clothes drive and where to take any donated clothes. I also coordinated with my parents in Tomahawk, WI and explained to them the mission and how they could help.
After the unit arrived in Kosovo, and we completed our relief in place (RIP) process and began our mission, I was very happy that I decided to conduct the clothes drive. The poverty that we witnessed was staggering, and it was very difficult to see anyone, especially children, living in the manner in which they did. Clothes were definitely something that everyone needed, and I had a good feeling that the mission would be widely accepted by the entire population, no matter what ethnicity they were. We did an assessment on which areas we needed to focus on the most and came up with a distribution plan to get the clothes out to them as quickly as we could, but in an organized, efficient, manner.
Clothes from both Germany and the United States began to arrive by the truckload. I was overwhelmed by the generosity that people showed. In many instances, people bought brand new clothes and donated them to our mission. As well as clothes, people donated shoes, jackets, winter clothes etc. As the boxes began to quickly pile up, we began our distribution plan.
As planned, we first began to distribute clothes to those who needed them the most. The reception by the people of Kosovo was incredible. Men, women and children alike were absolutely thrilled to be receiving the clothes, shoes, etc. In some of the villages that we stopped, there were people of several different ethnicities taking the clothes. What was incredible about this was that they were sharing the clothes together. When I saw this, I began to think that possibly this mission will succeed in trying to heal some of the wounds that these people have suffered from one another through years of ethnic conflict.
As the months went on, the clothes drive began to have better and better results. On one occasion, a village mayor approached me. He thanked me for the clothes we were giving away, and had heard we were giving clothes away throughout the region. He asked me to follow him to an area so that he could show me something and ask for our help. He brought me to the village school, which wasn’t much of a school in my eyes. The school had been bombed during the war and it was in much need of repair. He asked if there was any way we could help, and I told him absolutely we could help.
During a meeting between the mayor and myself, we arranged a date, and for him to bring manpower and supplies to the school. I told him that I would bring manpower and supplies as well. On the prearranged date, I arrived with several of the officers from our battalion staff and any others who wanted to help. As we arrived, I could see that he had a great deal of manpower and supplies already on site.
During the next several days, we mixed cement, and helped to carry supplies to carpenters who were rebuilding the school. While there, I saw a very old man who was helping in any way that he could. It was obvious that this man had a very hard life, and each day he arrived in the same tattered clothes as the day before. I had several boxes of clothes in the back of our trucks, and thought it would be good to give him some of those clothes, especially a sport jacket that had been donated. I brought the man over to our boxes and had him take any clothes that he wished. He was very happy and so thankful that we were giving him these clothes. Just before he left, I grabbed the sport jacket and put it on him. He broke down crying at the generosity. He had always wanted a jacket like that, but was never able to have one until now. He turned to me and shook my hand with such appreciation. We took a picture together, hugged and said our farewells. It was that handshake and picture that is the most significant day of my military career.
The most significant day of my military career was the handshake and picture because it was a very proud moment for me knowing that I had succeeded in something that I had set out to do, and also that I was able to give to people who were in such desperate need. I also believe that I had a very positive effect on those who took part in the clothes drive, especially the young Soldiers in my unit. It will certainly be a day that I will never forget, and will be an experience that I can bring to future units that I may be assigned to.
The views expressed in this essay are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
Over the course of my career, there have been several significant days. The first day as a brand new Second Lieutenant in my platoon, taking Company Command and crossing the border of Kuwait and Iraq heading towards Baghdad are a few of those significant days. However, it was a handshake and a picture during a clothes drive in Kosovo that is the most significant day of my military career.
From May 2002-November 2002, I was in command of my company and deployed to Kosovo. In preparation for the deployment, we conducted all of the necessary train-up, and were briefed that our primary role there would be as peacekeepers. As a military police officer, I knew that my company, and I, would be spending a great deal of time out on the roads, conducting area security and police intelligence operations. I knew this would put us out in the cities and villages, and we would be talking with people of all ethnic and religious backgrounds. I also knew that we would take part in helping to train a former Albanian Infantry unit that was changing into a Search and Rescue unit.
Knowing what our mission was and what our day to day business was going to entail, I began to think of different ways that we could bridge the gap between the different ethnicities we would encounter. I knew that it would be impossible to change their culture, but I knew that it was possible to have a positive effect on those that we encountered, and that possibly, through our efforts, we could bring some people together to share in a common good. After much thought, I decided that a clothes drive would be a mission that could help us in this effort.
At the time, I was stationed in Germany, so I began to coordinate with several Provost Marshal Offices across Germany to place clothes drop boxes in their offices. I also coordinated with the Garrison Commander’s Office in several Base Support Battalions across Germany to get the word out to the communities about the clothes drive and where to take any donated clothes. I also coordinated with my parents in Tomahawk, WI and explained to them the mission and how they could help.
After the unit arrived in Kosovo, and we completed our relief in place (RIP) process and began our mission, I was very happy that I decided to conduct the clothes drive. The poverty that we witnessed was staggering, and it was very difficult to see anyone, especially children, living in the manner in which they did. Clothes were definitely something that everyone needed, and I had a good feeling that the mission would be widely accepted by the entire population, no matter what ethnicity they were. We did an assessment on which areas we needed to focus on the most and came up with a distribution plan to get the clothes out to them as quickly as we could, but in an organized, efficient, manner.
Clothes from both Germany and the United States began to arrive by the truckload. I was overwhelmed by the generosity that people showed. In many instances, people bought brand new clothes and donated them to our mission. As well as clothes, people donated shoes, jackets, winter clothes etc. As the boxes began to quickly pile up, we began our distribution plan.
As planned, we first began to distribute clothes to those who needed them the most. The reception by the people of Kosovo was incredible. Men, women and children alike were absolutely thrilled to be receiving the clothes, shoes, etc. In some of the villages that we stopped, there were people of several different ethnicities taking the clothes. What was incredible about this was that they were sharing the clothes together. When I saw this, I began to think that possibly this mission will succeed in trying to heal some of the wounds that these people have suffered from one another through years of ethnic conflict.
As the months went on, the clothes drive began to have better and better results. On one occasion, a village mayor approached me. He thanked me for the clothes we were giving away, and had heard we were giving clothes away throughout the region. He asked me to follow him to an area so that he could show me something and ask for our help. He brought me to the village school, which wasn’t much of a school in my eyes. The school had been bombed during the war and it was in much need of repair. He asked if there was any way we could help, and I told him absolutely we could help.
During a meeting between the mayor and myself, we arranged a date, and for him to bring manpower and supplies to the school. I told him that I would bring manpower and supplies as well. On the prearranged date, I arrived with several of the officers from our battalion staff and any others who wanted to help. As we arrived, I could see that he had a great deal of manpower and supplies already on site.
During the next several days, we mixed cement, and helped to carry supplies to carpenters who were rebuilding the school. While there, I saw a very old man who was helping in any way that he could. It was obvious that this man had a very hard life, and each day he arrived in the same tattered clothes as the day before. I had several boxes of clothes in the back of our trucks, and thought it would be good to give him some of those clothes, especially a sport jacket that had been donated. I brought the man over to our boxes and had him take any clothes that he wished. He was very happy and so thankful that we were giving him these clothes. Just before he left, I grabbed the sport jacket and put it on him. He broke down crying at the generosity. He had always wanted a jacket like that, but was never able to have one until now. He turned to me and shook my hand with such appreciation. We took a picture together, hugged and said our farewells. It was that handshake and picture that is the most significant day of my military career.
The most significant day of my military career was the handshake and picture because it was a very proud moment for me knowing that I had succeeded in something that I had set out to do, and also that I was able to give to people who were in such desperate need. I also believe that I had a very positive effect on those who took part in the clothes drive, especially the young Soldiers in my unit. It will certainly be a day that I will never forget, and will be an experience that I can bring to future units that I may be assigned to.
The views expressed in this essay are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
Tuesday, September 9, 2008
MAJ Caldwell's Article
Well, for the most part, here is the article I will submit for publishing with the Duncanville Suburban Newspaper, Duncanville, Texas - My hometown newspaper.... Wonder if it will make the cut....????
JOE
The U.S. Military’s relationship with the Media
MAJ Joseph R. Caldwell
The purpose of this editorial is to inform readers on a new educational initiative for field grade officers at The Command and General Staff College (CGSC), located at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. CGSC is the mid-level formal educational college for all U.S. Army service members (active duty) in the rank of Major. The Combined Arms Center’s Commander, Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell (no relation to me) has recognized the importance of the mass media and its influence on public opinion. Additionally, he sees the positive impacts professional blog sites have as a forum to spread information, discuss new ideas, and debate certain topics. He recognizes the lack of experience necessary our military officers need to have in interacting with the media. The Army does have specialized media personnel with Brigade size units. However, LTG Caldwell believes all field grade officers need skills to effectively work with the media. LTC Caldwell has since instituted a new requirement for all current CGSC students. We must interact with the mass media! We actually have four requirements. One is, publish a news paper article, conduct a public speaking engagement, be interviewed by a member of the media, and establish a blog site on the internet.
Encouraging blogging is a new occurrence in the military’s culture. In most cases, it has been strictly frowned upon. LTG Caldwell’s vision has been met with some discord with fellow military officials. Having mid-level military officers freely go to the internet or press and express their points of view is a new endeavor for the U.S. Army. However, in the case of Blogging, I think it is inevitable. Currently, there are tens of thousands of recognized professional blog sites on the internet. LTG Caldwell wants field grade officers to actively engage in thought provoking board discussions via this medium. LTG Caldwell’s vision for the importance for effective and productive media relations and use of internet blog sites will in essence, leave his mark on the U.S. Army Officer Corps for years to come.
The most beneficial block of instruction thus far at the Command and General Staff College was the importance of effective relations between the U.S. Military and the Media. Media relations must be considered a combat multiplier by U.S. Military commanders. Media relations focused on lessons learned from past failures between the military commanders and the media, an depth synopsis of today’s modern media, and most importantly, how to prepare and interact with the media during a crisis situation. Interaction with the media is an arena where a commander at any level can find themselves in hot water if unprepared or found to be untruthful. Being untruthful in one’s statements to the media may not be on purpose, but as a result of not gathering vital facts before going on the record. This boils down to a lack of respect for how the media affects your operation, public opinion of your mission, or even you as an individual member of the U.S. Military. As time progresses, the United States military’s interaction with the world media corps will continue to grow and become more interconnected. We must be able to meet these evolving requirements if we like it or not.
We had an opportunity to meet with a professional media panel of experts from across the country. Members of the panel worked for the New York Times, Chicago Tribune, and LA Times. I found the interaction and questioning of the panel members very informative. They gave us their opinion on what their responsibilities are as journalists, and what they expect from the military. Real life events discussed during discussions with the panel gave a clear example of what to do, or what not to do when working with a media representative.
Since the existence of a unified United States Military, there has also been a following of their actives by newspapermen, story writers, or journalist of some sort. Throughout recent history, military commanders often find themselves at “war” with these very individuals. History shows us the painful lessons these commanders learned from their “hatred” of journalists and writers of the time. The news papers, (depending on which side you were behind) would outline and publish for the masses, every flaw or incompetence by that particular commander. Some newspapers in operation during the civil war had the capability to publish several thousand copies a day. Even more amazing, they could be distributed hundreds of miles on the same day of publication via rail road shipping. Blunders by military commanders where widely known within a week or two of event happening. History seems to repeat itself often when looking at the evolution of the interaction, or lack of interaction, between senior military officials and the media. Commanding officers were held accountable for the actions or inactions during their campaigns, just as they are today. As time progressed through the civil war, criticism from the media met stiff resistance from the military. No real trustworthy relationship was ever established. This is something we are working to eliminate today.
This same scenario happened to U.S. Military commanders in every armed conflict to present day. The United States public has become accustomed to having someone to blame for a mishap or failure. Today, politically charged journalists will do their best to paint the story in the manner in which best fits the political views or followings of their organization. We see this daily when viewing CNN verses Foxnews. And we, as military officers will find ourselves caught in the cross fire, and must be able to effective interact and function with opposing media view points. Again, this block of instruction hit the nail right on the head.
Today’s modern media comes in many forms. Mass communication is accomplished through television, radio, print, and via the internet. The internet, through relatively new, compiles most of the information or news transmitted on a daily basis. Through new technologies, people today have the ability read, see, and hear news reports as the event happens. In some cases, the event could be half way around the world and being reported in nearly real time. We as an American public have gotten used to this instant news coverage. In fact, we demand it now more than ever. Modern media will continue to become more advanced, and make mass communications from anywhere in the world instant. Military leaders must know how this rapid response of news coverage can and will affect their mission in a combat or peace keeping environment. Crises around the world will continue to happen. But now, with the advancement of the media’s ability to cover these events, military leaders must be prepared to interact with the media just as fast as they have to react to the crisis itself.
The most valuable lesson was how to plan, prepare, and execute a media engagement or interview during a crisis. How well a battalion commander reacts to a hostile media during a press conference could very well have an affect on the public’s opinion on the roll of the American military in that region. Again, the mass public at large is consistently looking for somebody to blame. And we, as a military have more to learn on effectively maintaining a balanced relationship with the media. Not so easy to do in some cases. We have seen recent events in Iraq, where the stupid actions of a young staff sergeant can have extreme damages to public opinion (both in the U.S. and Iraq). When an Army Staff Sergeant assigned to Multi National Division-Baghdad, used a Koran as a target on a rifle range, it made world news within one day of it being reported. It took the President of the United States to conduct “damage control” and make a statement on the U.S. military’s roll in Iraq. This event could have erupted into multiple violent actions across Iraq if not handled quickly and with precision. Keep this is mind, the actions of a staff sergeant made the President of the United States react to the media’s coverage of the event. If that is not powerful influence, I do not know what is. Media engagements during a reaction to a crisis situation or culturally sensitive action by a U.S. service member must be taking as seriously as the mission itself.
LTG Caldwell has the correct vision for education requirements of future senior leader in the U.S. Army. We must be able to effectively interact with the media. This is an area of operation that will continue to grow in depth and responsiveness. LTG Caldwell’s directive for CGSC students to actively interact with the media and participate in professional blog sites has been with some opposition. However, I personally feel his vision for what the future will demand from us as members of the U.S. Military are right on. I look forward to my next class on media relations.
JOE
The U.S. Military’s relationship with the Media
MAJ Joseph R. Caldwell
The purpose of this editorial is to inform readers on a new educational initiative for field grade officers at The Command and General Staff College (CGSC), located at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. CGSC is the mid-level formal educational college for all U.S. Army service members (active duty) in the rank of Major. The Combined Arms Center’s Commander, Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell (no relation to me) has recognized the importance of the mass media and its influence on public opinion. Additionally, he sees the positive impacts professional blog sites have as a forum to spread information, discuss new ideas, and debate certain topics. He recognizes the lack of experience necessary our military officers need to have in interacting with the media. The Army does have specialized media personnel with Brigade size units. However, LTG Caldwell believes all field grade officers need skills to effectively work with the media. LTC Caldwell has since instituted a new requirement for all current CGSC students. We must interact with the mass media! We actually have four requirements. One is, publish a news paper article, conduct a public speaking engagement, be interviewed by a member of the media, and establish a blog site on the internet.
Encouraging blogging is a new occurrence in the military’s culture. In most cases, it has been strictly frowned upon. LTG Caldwell’s vision has been met with some discord with fellow military officials. Having mid-level military officers freely go to the internet or press and express their points of view is a new endeavor for the U.S. Army. However, in the case of Blogging, I think it is inevitable. Currently, there are tens of thousands of recognized professional blog sites on the internet. LTG Caldwell wants field grade officers to actively engage in thought provoking board discussions via this medium. LTG Caldwell’s vision for the importance for effective and productive media relations and use of internet blog sites will in essence, leave his mark on the U.S. Army Officer Corps for years to come.
The most beneficial block of instruction thus far at the Command and General Staff College was the importance of effective relations between the U.S. Military and the Media. Media relations must be considered a combat multiplier by U.S. Military commanders. Media relations focused on lessons learned from past failures between the military commanders and the media, an depth synopsis of today’s modern media, and most importantly, how to prepare and interact with the media during a crisis situation. Interaction with the media is an arena where a commander at any level can find themselves in hot water if unprepared or found to be untruthful. Being untruthful in one’s statements to the media may not be on purpose, but as a result of not gathering vital facts before going on the record. This boils down to a lack of respect for how the media affects your operation, public opinion of your mission, or even you as an individual member of the U.S. Military. As time progresses, the United States military’s interaction with the world media corps will continue to grow and become more interconnected. We must be able to meet these evolving requirements if we like it or not.
We had an opportunity to meet with a professional media panel of experts from across the country. Members of the panel worked for the New York Times, Chicago Tribune, and LA Times. I found the interaction and questioning of the panel members very informative. They gave us their opinion on what their responsibilities are as journalists, and what they expect from the military. Real life events discussed during discussions with the panel gave a clear example of what to do, or what not to do when working with a media representative.
Since the existence of a unified United States Military, there has also been a following of their actives by newspapermen, story writers, or journalist of some sort. Throughout recent history, military commanders often find themselves at “war” with these very individuals. History shows us the painful lessons these commanders learned from their “hatred” of journalists and writers of the time. The news papers, (depending on which side you were behind) would outline and publish for the masses, every flaw or incompetence by that particular commander. Some newspapers in operation during the civil war had the capability to publish several thousand copies a day. Even more amazing, they could be distributed hundreds of miles on the same day of publication via rail road shipping. Blunders by military commanders where widely known within a week or two of event happening. History seems to repeat itself often when looking at the evolution of the interaction, or lack of interaction, between senior military officials and the media. Commanding officers were held accountable for the actions or inactions during their campaigns, just as they are today. As time progressed through the civil war, criticism from the media met stiff resistance from the military. No real trustworthy relationship was ever established. This is something we are working to eliminate today.
This same scenario happened to U.S. Military commanders in every armed conflict to present day. The United States public has become accustomed to having someone to blame for a mishap or failure. Today, politically charged journalists will do their best to paint the story in the manner in which best fits the political views or followings of their organization. We see this daily when viewing CNN verses Foxnews. And we, as military officers will find ourselves caught in the cross fire, and must be able to effective interact and function with opposing media view points. Again, this block of instruction hit the nail right on the head.
Today’s modern media comes in many forms. Mass communication is accomplished through television, radio, print, and via the internet. The internet, through relatively new, compiles most of the information or news transmitted on a daily basis. Through new technologies, people today have the ability read, see, and hear news reports as the event happens. In some cases, the event could be half way around the world and being reported in nearly real time. We as an American public have gotten used to this instant news coverage. In fact, we demand it now more than ever. Modern media will continue to become more advanced, and make mass communications from anywhere in the world instant. Military leaders must know how this rapid response of news coverage can and will affect their mission in a combat or peace keeping environment. Crises around the world will continue to happen. But now, with the advancement of the media’s ability to cover these events, military leaders must be prepared to interact with the media just as fast as they have to react to the crisis itself.
The most valuable lesson was how to plan, prepare, and execute a media engagement or interview during a crisis. How well a battalion commander reacts to a hostile media during a press conference could very well have an affect on the public’s opinion on the roll of the American military in that region. Again, the mass public at large is consistently looking for somebody to blame. And we, as a military have more to learn on effectively maintaining a balanced relationship with the media. Not so easy to do in some cases. We have seen recent events in Iraq, where the stupid actions of a young staff sergeant can have extreme damages to public opinion (both in the U.S. and Iraq). When an Army Staff Sergeant assigned to Multi National Division-Baghdad, used a Koran as a target on a rifle range, it made world news within one day of it being reported. It took the President of the United States to conduct “damage control” and make a statement on the U.S. military’s roll in Iraq. This event could have erupted into multiple violent actions across Iraq if not handled quickly and with precision. Keep this is mind, the actions of a staff sergeant made the President of the United States react to the media’s coverage of the event. If that is not powerful influence, I do not know what is. Media engagements during a reaction to a crisis situation or culturally sensitive action by a U.S. service member must be taking as seriously as the mission itself.
LTG Caldwell has the correct vision for education requirements of future senior leader in the U.S. Army. We must be able to effectively interact with the media. This is an area of operation that will continue to grow in depth and responsiveness. LTG Caldwell’s directive for CGSC students to actively interact with the media and participate in professional blog sites has been with some opposition. However, I personally feel his vision for what the future will demand from us as members of the U.S. Military are right on. I look forward to my next class on media relations.
Our First Blog
Well... This is a group effort!!! So, here are the members of Section 18C...
SGA MAJ Ric Lebron
Mr. Alan Lowe - Civilian Instructor
SGL MAJ Rey Ramos
ASGL MAJ Jason Shelton
LTC Var Veasna - Cambodia
LCDR David Sideward US Navy
MAJ John Adams
MAJ Joseph Caldwell
MAJ Shawn Kahler
MAJ Anthony King
MAJ Thomas Layborn
MAJ Brad Martin
MAJ Hugh McCauley
MAJ James McLean
MAJ Chris McMartin US Air Force
MAJ Anthony Nelson
MAJ Rhonda St. Peters
MAJ Jackie Kaine
MORE TO FOLLOW!!!!!!!
SGA MAJ Ric Lebron
Mr. Alan Lowe - Civilian Instructor
SGL MAJ Rey Ramos
ASGL MAJ Jason Shelton
LTC Var Veasna - Cambodia
LCDR David Sideward US Navy
MAJ John Adams
MAJ Joseph Caldwell
MAJ Shawn Kahler
MAJ Anthony King
MAJ Thomas Layborn
MAJ Brad Martin
MAJ Hugh McCauley
MAJ James McLean
MAJ Chris McMartin US Air Force
MAJ Anthony Nelson
MAJ Rhonda St. Peters
MAJ Jackie Kaine
MORE TO FOLLOW!!!!!!!
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