Major Thomas E. Laybourn CGSC Student, Section 18C

An adage exists in the military which is unfortunately very accurate: “we train for the war we just fought.” Though in many aspects our Army has made tremendous advances tactically and technologically, one area that is very much neglected is cultural understanding of the nation or group whom we plan on fighting. For decades, the unwritten tactical rule advocated using firepower, maneuver, and protection to defeat enemies. This concept was very much a product of our past campaigns with industrialized nations (like Germany or Japan) and the threat of war with the Soviet Union or Communist China. Being able to talk to the enemy or their civilians was tangentially addressed but never viewed as a priority for all but a few very specialized units. An ability to speak with and understand the enemy didn’t matter… they would be killed. This heavy handed concept has been reexamined because of the guerrilla nature of the Global War on Terrorism. The change in operations was certainly an emergent change or a change which gradually developed out of necessity (Jick, 2003, p.16). Though our tactics have altered to better face our present enemy, specifically the terrorists in Iraq and Afghanistan, our focus on linguistics and cultural awareness is still negligible. For most maneuver units, training timelines are very condensed given the frequency of deployments. This forces commanders to focus their limited time and resources on essential training tasks and events; live fire exercises, medical training, and marksmanship. For many commanders, the emphasis on tangible results justifies a program which puts linguistics and cultural awareness on the back burner. Often, if it is trained on, it is only addressed as a “check the block” event, where minimal effort is applied. In fairness, one must acknowledge that some effort has been made by the Army and commanders to give units a minimal level of cultural understanding. Often, units will identify one or two Soldiers out of every 40 to attend a week long language course, and annually all Soldiers are given cultural awareness classes on Middle Eastern Culture; these classes normally take two to three days depending on the program. Though some attempt has been made to address language training and cultural education, the end result is mediocre for most units. Frequently, Soldiers learn about the culture they are going to be facing once they are in the theater of operations they have deployed to.
Unfortunately, by the time a Soldier learns enough of the language to be effective, or the nuances of cultural etiquette, it is several months into the deployment and valuable time has been wasted. To adequately leverage language and cultural sensitivity as a tool on the modern battlefield requires a greater exposure for our Soldiers to the language of the enemy they will be facing. To accommodate this exposure will require a change in how our units do business in garrison environments.
For most indigenous people, including those in Iraq and Afghanistan, active warfare is limited to a very small part of their population. The vast majority of the population will probably be indifferent to the campaign one way or the other. Though the population as a whole may passively support the insurgents or guerrillas, they mostly attempt to keep to their own lives unless acted on in a negative manner. A civilian will certainly know who the insurgents are in his area but will not feel compelled identify them unless he connects with the invader more than he does his insurgent neighbor. For this reason the value in understanding the indigenous culture for an invading Army is profound. Paramount in this understanding of culture is being able to speak the language of the indigenous population. A study made during the Vietnam war found that “all field advisors interviewed who had some mastery of Vietnamese had found it an invaluable asset” (Ramsey, 2006, p.152). True understanding of a culture requires immersion in many lengthy classes, however, a relatively benign technique for interacting with civilians of a different culture is conversation. It must be acknowledged that learning a different language, like cultural awareness, is remarkably challenging and requires a great deal of time to become proficient for most people. However, a rudimentary understanding can be arrived at with relatively little effort. As a cultural tool, communications can help endear indigenous persons to our Soldiers as well as enable better gathering of intelligence on the battlefield. Though interpreters do exist, they are not abundant enough to be present on every patrol. Without an ability to communicate it is challenging for Soldiers to differentiate from sadiki (friends) and enemy. Interpreters drawn from the local population may also have ulterior motives and seek to deceive their American employers. Therefore, an ability to communicate, even at an elementary level, is as important to a Soldier as having enough bullets… perhaps more so.
Interestingly, our Army has a tremendous amount of institutional knowledge concerning successful execution of guerrilla campaigns and the effectiveness of cultural understanding at the Soldier level. Our nation’s military history is actually filled with numerous campaigns with guerilla elements, which Kipling refers to as “savage wars of peace” (Karshtedt, 2006, para. 5). These wars, aimed at quelling rebellions or insurgencies, fostered a great deal of educational movement at the Soldier level within the Army. With one campaign in particular, the Philippine Insurrection, the effectiveness of units quelling rebellious “insurrectos” was generally related to a unit’s ability to interact with the local populace in a civil way.
The Taft administration encouraged a policy known as “benevolent assimilation” for the territories that were gained from the war with Spain, including the Philippine Islands. The concept revolved around the feeling that the native peoples of these new territories would become Americanized and ultimately benefit from the advances made in our industrialized culture (Linn, 2002). Ironically, Americans found that in their quest to Americanize the Philippines, they had to gain a better understanding of the culture and the language of the natives. To encourage the Phillipino people to transition required significant communications skills at the Soldier level. Without a basic understanding of their culture and language the assimilation could only occur through violence.
Though revisionist academic culture has sought to paint the American campaigns in the Philippines as brutal and oppressive, the United States was successful in that campaign because of their willingness to assist the civilian population peacefully. Interestingly, in the case of the Philippines, a logistical peculiarity enhanced the American campaign. Units that fought in the Philippine Islands came from posts (forts) or states that were west of the Mississippi River, especially the Southwest. In these regions of the United States, even in 1900, Spanish was widely understood. Apart from tremendous tactical experience fighting guerilla wars against the American Indians, Soldiers heading to the Philippines often had the ability to communicate with the merchant and land owning castes in the Philippines, as these elements spoke Spanish rather than other native dialects.
In contrast to successes, many cases of failed campaigning came from arrogant alienation of the local populace by the occupying forces. One incident in particular resulted in dreadful casualties for both sides on the island of Samar. Marines and Soldiers garrisoning the towns on the island were especially brutal and made no attempt to interact with the local population. In an arrogant disregard for the guidance of “benevolent assimilation” American forces on Samar conducted their patrols most violently and expected the locals to adopt the customs of the Americans unconditionally. The result was a lengthy guerilla campaign recognized more for destruction than any attempt to help the native people. Furthermore, the violence caused a sense of alienation
which encouraged the civilians to support the guerillas without question and rise up in open rebellion (Linn, 2002).
Similar patterns, successful and unsuccessful, have been observed in more recent American campaigns in Korea, El Salvador and Vietnam. “Developing rapport was just the beginning,” says Ramsey of advisors during the Vietnam War, and key to building rapport with a foreign people is speaking their language and understanding their customs (Ramsey, 2006, p. 50).
Recently, another example of cultural and linguistic knowledge augmenting tactical success occurred in Iraq. After the much advertised troop surge, which placed an additional 30,000 American troops in Iraq, succeeded in reducing violence, a peculiar transformation began to develop in many regions of that nation. Local populations actively sought out Americans on patrol in order to give them information on insurgents. This metamorphosis did not happen over night. The Army as a whole has inadvertently incorporated cultural knowledge into its units as a result of its extended experience in Iraq. But not all units had an abundance of veterans to leverage cultural knowledge. One relatively new unit has had a great deal of success in no small part because of the cultural training they received prior to their deployment. This unit is C Troop of the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment, known as “Comanche” Troop. Comanche troop was built from scratch from October 2005 and deployed to Iraq in early February of 2007.
With just over a year to prepare, the Comanche Troopers, most of whom were new Soldiers to the Army, were subjected to a very strenuous training program similar to every other unit in their division and even in the Army as a whole. Their training differed in that they had a regular linguistic training regiment as well as Arabic cultural reinforcements in all their training events. Every Soldier in their 80 man troop was enrolled in a language program called Rosetta Stone. Additionally, every Soldier in the troop was provided with Arabic language pamphlets and workbooks already developed by the Army. The emphasis on language was also integrated into training exercises where Soldiers role played as enemy or practiced their language skills as friendly forces. The training regiment was incorporated into everyday garrison life and made Arabic linguistics seem, in some part, second nature. When Comanche Troop participated in a set of maneuvers at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, which employs hundreds of Arabic speakers who serve as role players, the feedback from cadre and roll players alike was extremely positive; the Comanches held an elementary understanding of the Arabic language even at the lowest level. C Troop had effectively incorporated knowledge of Arabic into their unit and employed it as a tool.
The real validation for the Comanches came months later after they had deployed to Iraq. In the East Rashid district of Baghdad, part of a volatile area known as Dora, the Comanches and their comrades from 1-4 Cavalry had many tough fights. However, their determined application of census patrols, with active interaction with the local Iraqis, eventually won over the indigenous population and increased the level of HUMINT (Human Intelligence) gathered on each patrol. During census patrols, groups of ten to fifteen Soldiers move by foot or truck to some predetermined group of homes in their zone. Once there, they go to each home, enter and take a census of the family; names, occupation, how their electricity or other civic needs are being met, etc…
The Comanches had been trained on the importance of courtesy prior to the deployment as well as peculiarities of Arab culture. A training team was coordinated for and visited Comanche Troop and their Squadron on two occasions as well as another cultural awareness seminar while at Fort Irwin. When Soldiers would enter Iraqi homes it was more like a casual visit with friends, and their passing ability to communicate in Arabic established positive relationships with many Iraqis who had become jaded from years of violence that appeared interminable. The local Iraqis became so comfortable with the Americans that they would invite the Comanches in for tea, or supper which is customary in Iraqi culture for guests. During these visits, Soldiers would practice their elementary Arabic and break the ice with the Iraqis establishing the foundation for acceptance as well as gathering valuable information about their zone. Additionally, the inhabitants of the Comanches’ zone began to have positive associations with the Americans and even developed close friendships with Soldiers.
Fortunately, the cultural education the Soldiers received before the deployment prepared them for potentially awkward situations that arose from friendly interaction with Arabs. One humorous event involved SFC Scott Hanzich, a Platoon Sergeant in Comanche troop. SFC Hanzich had been taught about the frequency with which Arabs touch members of the same sex. As McShane points out, “nonverbal communication is more important in some cultures than others” (McShane, 2008, p.325). The nonverbal communication of touching hands or hugging shows great respect in Arab culture. SFC Hanzich befriended an Iraqi Police Lieutenant who insisted on closer contact than would be culturally acceptable in the United States. Though he privately endured the good natured ridicule of his peers, he knew that the Iraqi was simply showing friendship rather than making obscene advances. “If I had not known about their touchy-feely ways I would have punched this guy,” recalled Hanzich (Hanzich, 2007). Now, the Iraqis and the Americans are actively working together and have a greater feeling of friendship and cooperation. This transformation not only alienated the terrorists but has caused a dramatic decrease in attacks and an increase in insurgents captured after being exposed by their neighbors.
Acknowledging that language and cultural understanding are valuable tools is easy for any commander. However, implementing a plan for training which incorporates language and culture into every day is more challenging. Sending troops away to lengthy language courses is impractical and costly. Furthermore, if too much effort is placed on linguistics and not enough on other essential tasks the Army would be filled with thousands of Arabic speakers who cannot shoot or render first aid! Advertising this vision for change within a unit will require some commitment from the chain of command because as Jick and Peiperl state “to make change successful, some picture of the desired future state- vision- is essential” (Jick, 2003, p.92). Fortunately, tools exist already which can enable a commander to keep linguistics a priority in their units without hampering other mission essential training events:
Rosetta Stone: the Army has a contract with the Rosetta Stone Language Company and their language software is available on the Army Knowledge Online website for use by any Soldier. Enrolling is simple and using the program is very easy. The benefit of this system is that upon completion of a lesson the Soldier receives a certificate. This certificate validates that they are doing their homework and is also worth college credit at many institutions!
Additionally, each lesson can be completed in four hours. Since the lessons are broken down into ten portions, it does not require an abundance of time for the Soldier and can easily be completed during the day. Requiring a certificate at the end of each month is realistic even for the most academically challenged. As there will certainly be resistance from many of the Soldiers, advertising the benefits of the program will help internalize the action. Posting a stated vision for the program is one technique that has great value and has been used in the Army as well as the civilian sector (Jick, 2003).
Defense Language Institute Arabic Language Survival Guide: The Army has published a very practical and user friendly pamphlet which has essential phrases in it for any Soldier during a campaign. Distribution of these documents months prior to a deployment will enable Soldiers to familiarize themselves with them and use them as a reference when studying on Rosetta Stone or other language mediums. Though some commanders may be hesitant to distribute these resources as some Soldiers will loose them, it is advisable nonetheless. Creativity can easily be applied to ensure troops keep this reference on their persons by making it mandatory or punishing those who loose these documents.
Kwikpoint Reference Cards: The Kwikpoint reference cards, which have pictures of actions and things along with English and Arabic translations enable Soldiers with even the most elementary language skill to be able to communicate with the locals. Distribute these long before the deployment and order more for surplus. Being familiar with these cards can enable any Soldier to communicate, even if they have no understanding of Arabic whatsoever!
Cultural Training: Every major installation in the Army has access to Middle Eastern Cultural Training Teams who are available for educating Soldiers. Normally, installations and units incorporate these teams to train their elements over a two or three day period prior to a deployment. Increasing the frequency of these training visits to once a quarter as opposed to once annually will improve the individual Soldier’s appreciation for the culture in which he is going to be exposed. This appreciation, though it may not be genuine, can at least cultivate an understanding and prevent negative perceptions which can quickly alienate Soldiers from the civilians they need to interact with.
Find a validation exercise: Posted visions and active training will certainly have positive benefits for to ingraining the language skills in one’s Soldiers. However, witnessing the benefits firsthand reinforce the value of language skills and encourage troops to learn more about the culture in which they are going to be immersed. The National Training Center as well as the Joint Readiness Training Center both have extensive numbers of Arabic speaking role players. This will be the best opportunity for a unit to validate their language and cultural skills, as every unit must participate in one of these maneuvers prior to deploying to Iraq. For the Soldiers, they will see first hand that even a rudimentary skill with the foreign tongue will assist their patrols greatly.
Ultimately, the need to incorporate linguistics training and cultural sensitivity is imperative for the success of our Army in any campaign. Though our current conflict compels our troops to focus on the languages of the Middle East, like Arabic and Pashto, a systemic approach to language training using existing tools can augment our Army’s ability regardless of what nation or culture in which we are required to fight. Use of cultural awareness training teams, language pamphlets, quick reference guides and computer programs like Rosetta Stone give commanders an easy method for tracking their unit’s language proficiency, and can provide them metrics when they attend maneuvers at any of our training centers. In the end, the success of foreign language skills and cultural understanding manifests itself in combat. For in an environment as unforgiving as war, an ability to understand a warning given in a foreign tongue can mean the difference between life and death.

This posting does not nessecarily reflect the official stance of the United States Army. This is my own work and reflects my opinion. Thomas E. Laybourn, 16SEP08