Modernizing the USAF--"Cutting Edge" or "Good Enough?"

by Maj Chris McMartin, USAF

NOTE: The following is the opinion of the author and does not necessarily reflect the views, policy, or opinion of the Department of Defense or United States Air Force.

The United States Air Force in its various incarnations has enjoyed a technological advantage over every other nation’s air arm practically since the dawn of powered flight. Since World War Two, this advantage has come at an increasing cost, to the point where in 2005 the Air Force was willing to reduce its personnel end strength by 40,000 Airmen, in part to justify the purchase of a few additional fighters.[i] It is imperative the incoming Presidential Administration reverse this trend. The Administration should opt instead to recapitalize the Air Force by purchasing “sufficient” advanced weapon systems instead of absolute cutting-edge technology. In doing so, the Air Force will be able to afford both more aircraft more often as well as more personnel. The effects will be reduced fatigue and operations tempo, and a more rapid technology deployment cycle to better keep up with changing threats.

The trend in spiraling costs for military aircraft is not new. Three decades ago, an Air Force major lamented the fact that, despite technology typically driving prices down (as in the case of automobiles), fighter aircraft cost eight times as much per pound by the 1970s as they did in World War Two—a cost increase six times as high as that for commercial aircraft.[ii] His suggestion was to pay several aircraft manufacturers an annual fee to develop new aircraft regularly, in order to keep development costs down. I suggest a different approach, more attuned to the computer age.

Moore’s Law from 1965 stipulates the number of transistors on a computer chip (and, by extension, computing power) doubles every 24 months. This hypothesis has proven true over the last 40-plus years.[iii] An end-user corollary is that no matter what computer a consumer buys, it will be obsolete in two years. This has led some industry pundits to advise consumers to purchase as much computer as they can possibly afford, so that it will not go obsolete as quickly as a cheaper (and presumably less-powerful) model. The consequence of such a decision is to hold on to that expensive computer as long as possible to “get the consumer’s money’s worth,” even though by the time it is finally retired it is several generations behind the current technology. The Air Force’s current inventory, which includes KC-135s and B-52s—both designs over 50 years old—seems to reflect this mentality.

However, a different school of thought posits that buying only sufficient computing power needed at the time is more efficient, as not only will the purchase be cheaper, the difference in price can be applied toward a more powerful model as the newer technology’s price decreases in the future. This concept can easily translate into military aircraft purchases.

A combination of superior technology and superior crew training gives the United States its decisive edge in air power. The technology advantage has typically been very large, though the Former Soviet Union made great strides in this respect during the 1980s and 1990s with their fourth- and fifth-generation fighters. Given the absence of this peer competitor, and the next peer competitor (China) still lagging in the technological realm, the Air Force needs simply to buy aircraft that are “good enough” to preserve a small, but still present, technological advantage. The cost savings realized by this approach would free up funds to allocate towards near-term future aircraft purchases, instead of being committed to maintaining outdated technology for a longer period of time.

Not only would this approach to aircraft procurement allow for more rapid “technology refreshes” than current practice; the reduced cost would provide funding for more individual aircraft as well as more personnel in the force. This would have a two-pronged effect.
First, the Air Force would be more flexible in that it could operate in more theaters simultaneously. Currently, because each type of aircraft costs so much (not just fighters, but support aircraft such as C-17s), fewer of each type are produced. An aircraft cannot be in two locations at once, so the lower numbers of aircraft must be prioritized as to which theater will receive their services (a prime example today is the “low density/high demand” concept evident in most ISR platforms). Having more aircraft available also means individual aircraft would not have to fly as many hours as they currently sustain, thereby increasing their service life. The War on Terror has already shortened the programmed service life of C-17s to the point that analysts say up to three times the originally-budgeted number of planes will be needed to sustain combat support operations.[iv]

Second, an addition in personnel end strength would reduce operations tempo. This year the Air Force announced a restructuring of its Aerospace Expeditionary Force (AEF) concept, which initially entailed a 1:4 dwell ratio (4 months deployed, 16 months at home station), to reflect the reality of many personnel in “stressed” career fields experiencing a 1:1 dwell (in some cases, 6 months deployed, 6 months at home station ad infinitum).[v] While the move was meant to better align the AEF cycle with joint planning constraints, it tacitly acknowledges the increasing operations tempo for career fields suffering a decline in their experienced personnel (for example, Security Forces) due to both voluntary and involuntary separations. Thankfully, Secretary of Defense put an end to the 40,000-troop force reduction in progress and proposed increasing end strength in the next few years.[vi] Future savings from buying sufficient rather than cutting-edge aircraft would enable the Air Force to build back up to previous personnel levels, helping to alleviate the pain in these stressed career fields.

Critics of this proposal to buy “good enough” vs. “absolute best” aircraft may worry about falling behind technologically. However, as previously mentioned, the Air Force’s advantage comes not only from superior equipment but superior training. General “Buster” Ellis, former commander 19th Air Force (Air Education and Training Command), extols the virtues of America’s superior pilot training—a combination of instructor ability and simulators.[vii]

The synergy offered by the combination of superior training and the proposed “sufficiently” advanced aircraft will maintain the United States Air Force’s combat edge and, more importantly, will allow for aircraft refresh cycles to be greatly reduced—clearly an advantage when working to counter an ever-changing threat scenario.

Military aircraft costs have increased too quickly for too long. The next Presidential Administration has a golden opportunity to reverse this trend and argue for sufficiency rather than cutting-edge technology for the next generation of aircraft. The savings realized can be immediately put to use in rejuvenating personnel end strength, reducing operations tempo in critical career fields, and purchasing more aircraft, extending service life for the entire fleet. In the long term, the ability to develop and field new aircraft using the savings from buying “good enough” aircraft now will pay dividends in allowing the Air Force to recapitalize its inventory more often to counter constantly changing adversaries worldwide.
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[i] Wynne, Michael W. and General T. Michael Moseley. Air Force Posture Statement 2008, page 18.
[ii] Stark, Major Frederick T. “Why Military Airplanes Cost So Much and What Can Be Done About It.” Air University Review, Nov-Dec 1973.
[iii] “Moore’s Law—Made Real by Intel Innovation.” http://www.intel.com/technology/mooreslaw/; accessed 20 Oct 2008.
[iv] “Air Transportation” 17 April 2005. Strategy Page web site. http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htairmo/articles/20050417.aspx; accessed 20 Oct 2008.
[v] Wicke, TSgt Russell. “AEF Evolves for Stressed Career Fields.” Air Force Link, 02 June 2008. http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123101035; accessed 20 Oct 2008.
[vi] Randolph, SSgt Monique. “Air Force Charts New Course for 2009 Force Shaping.” Air Force Link, 12 June 2008. http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123102609; accessed 20 Oct 2008.
[vii] Miles, Donna. “Aircrew Training Ensures U.S. Air Superiority.” American Forces Press Service, 07 Sep 2004. http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=25383; accessed 20 Oct 2008.