In anticipation of my next PCS I have been doing quite a bit of research on my next location and the housing market. Theoretically, it is now a buyer’s market; however, not all areas of the country are seeing price reductions due to the mortgage crises. My next location just happens to be one with a fairly strong market. I have found several sites that are helpful with finding a home and determining how much a house may be worth.
Information on the amount a property last sold for can be found on the county tax assessors’ web site. Type into your search engine and the name of the city or county you plan on moving and “assessor’s office” or “public real estate records” and you can research the property to include not only the last sales price, but the tax assessment on the property.
Another way to get a ball park estimate of property value is to find information on Comparables. Comparables should be the properties in the approximate area (say within 1 mile) that have sold within the last few months. Don’t look at other houses on the market as comparables – that price may be just what a seller hopes to get which may or may not be based on actual worth. Knowing what comparables sold for can help you to determine what price you should base your offer. This information should be particularly helpful to anyone who is trying to buy or sell a home on their own and needs help to determine fair market value. It is also a great way to check the claims made on real estate web pages. For example I came across an add stating:
“Below market value! $90,000 in upgrades for fifty cents on the dollar.” A bit of research showed that the house had been purchased 2 years ago for over $150,000 less than the current asking price. I found that average appreciation per year in that area had been 7% however, this year the market saw a depreciation of 4%. Considering all this, the asking price of the house should have been around $515,000, not the $570,000 they are asking. Another consideration is that renovations do not necessarily bring a dollar for dollar return. Also, if a renovation is very buyer specific, you can expect no return. Some renovations offer nearly 100 return, others go for as little as 5%. I found the return on investment rates for renovations at www.remodeling.hw.net/2008/costvsvalue/national.aspx. For the area I am looking, properties are generally being sold for 94% of the asking price, with very expensive properties pulling in only 82-88% and less costly properties reaching the higher end of the scale.
Other Helpful sites:
Walkscore.com: This site focuses on urban dwellers who like the conveniences o f walking to everything. This web site lists community’s amenities such as restaurants theaters, schools, parks, retail stores, and supermarkets that are within walking distance to the address in which you are interested. It also integrates Google map view so you can check out the neighborhood. Many of the restaurants, shops, and parks have reviews by locales.
www.trulia.com: This site has good information on market trends and real estate overview. It provides some public records information and links to local real estate sites. The site can also be set up to send price alerts on changes made to the price of specific properties.
Zillow.com: This site has a feature that gives an estimate of the value of a property should be; just type in the address and get an estimate. Click on “comparables” and the site shows you a map and list view of all properties that sold within a one mile radius to include Zillow’s original estimate and the amount the property actually sold for. I found that they were pretty close to their estimates; most of the properties actually sold for a bit less – some for a bit more, but not much more. This gives you a really good starting point for your offer. Some realtors indicate if you can show a rational for a lower offer than the asking price as proof that your offer is reasonable, it puts you in a stronger bargaining position.
Frontdoor.com: This is a website sponsored by HGTV. It runs a bit slow but has some helpful features like community profiles on large cities, links to good earth which gives a street view of properties, and links to the listing agent’s site.
The views expressed in this blog are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
Thursday, February 19, 2009
Friday, January 30, 2009
McCauley FCS
The United States Army is at a critical juncture in force modernization. The Army has not introduced a completely new combat system since the late 1980’s, those were the Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle, M1 Abrams Main Battle Tank, Blackhawk Utility Helicopter, and the Apache Attack Helicopter. For over 20 years the Army has relied on those proven combat systems which have been periodically upgraded to stay ahead of potential adversaries. Shortly after the turn of the millennium the Army began development of the Future Combat System (FCS). The FCS is a highly complex and ambitious program aimed at creating a force able to defeat any future threat and retain our technological superiority. The FCS budget has been increased from $91.4 billion to 160.9 billion and the end date for final fielding has been pushed back several times. With the current economic crisis and the impending election coming up the focus on the FCS has been mainly negative. Several key questions have been asked, such as; “what should the Army do with the Future Combat System?” Should this program continue? Should it be modified or adjusted? Or should the FCS program be cancelled? We will try and answer these questions, because it is clear that the FCS program will continue to be scrutinized.
As stated earlier the Army is at a critical juncture in force modernization and the FCS program is the center of gravity of the Army’s future. In less than two weeks the United States will elect a new President and one of the candidates has stated that he will look at reducing military expenditures. Since the FCS budget has increased by almost $70 billion it is sure to be given a hard look by the next administration. Especially a administration that wants to reduce budgets. FCS is due to begin initial fielding in 2015 and have 15 brigade fully fielded in 2030. At that time the current combat systems in the Army will be approaching 50 years of service. The FCS program relies heavily on emerging technologies many of which have not been tested in a military environment. The center of gravity for the FCS program is the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) communications network and the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) radio system, neither of which have been field tested. Both have amazing potential but remain unproven. The Army has taken the viewpoint that these technologies married up with the new FCS vehicles and other systems will create a force that no other Army could stand against. Opponents of the FCS have taken the view that WIN-T and JTRS may never be ready and the will cause numerous delays and budget increases. The Army wants this program to continue and even though there have been problems with the FCS, the program must continue because Army combat systems are over 20 years old, and this is the only modernization project in the pipeline.
Should the Army cancel the FCS project? If the FCS is cancelled that would stop the only major combat system development program in the Army. Cancelling the FCS may in the short term be fiscally advantageous for the country, but in the long term disastrous. With combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan ongoing and the potential for each conflict to continue for many more years the cumulative wear and tear on these combat systems is high. Furthermore, with Russia, China and India emerging as regional and world powers the potential for limited or full combat operations against any of those nations is probable. Also, with our combat systems engaged in two conflicts the potential for a future adversary to study weaknesses and develop tactics to overcome our current advantages is likely. The Army needs to develop new combat systems to replace our current fleet and cancelling the FCS program would be catastrophic for the Army in future conflicts.
The FCS program is vital to ensure the Army’s dominance on the battlefield in future conflicts. The question is if the FCS program the correct way to go about modernizing the Army? The main issue with the FCS other than funding is the use emerging and unproven technologies. If the FCS program could incorporate technologies that are proven that may not provide the full potential of WIN-T and JTRS, but a reasonable facsimile we could modernize the force for less money and on a quicker timeline. There are wireless technologies and Internet Protocol (IP) based radio systems the Army is using today in Iraq that could be the gap filler until WIN-T works. These commercial off the shelf (COTs) equipment would be a drastic improvement over current Army communications systems. WIN-T and JTRS need to be fully developed and should stay in the research and development arena (R&D). It is critical to continue with R&D programs and use them to upgrade combat systems as they become available, much like JNN and SINCGARS. Furthermore, the Army needs to begin R&D for a replacement for the M1 Main Battle Tank and all of its helicopters. The need for a main battle tank must not be ignored. Yes, they take longer to deploy but the main battle tank has ruled the battlefield for almost 70 years and in a major conflict they will be required and as good as the M1 is it is getting old. The Army is placing all of its modernization eggs in one basket with the FCS program and that is dangerous.
The Army must go forward with the FCS program, but it should be modified to make use of existing technologies. Removing WIN-T from the FCS program will reduce cost and the amount of time required to field the system. Research and development on WIN-T and JTRS needs to continue but they should not be tied to the FCS program. Also, the Army needs develop replacements for all of its major combat systems.
V/R
MAJ Hugh McCauley
As stated earlier the Army is at a critical juncture in force modernization and the FCS program is the center of gravity of the Army’s future. In less than two weeks the United States will elect a new President and one of the candidates has stated that he will look at reducing military expenditures. Since the FCS budget has increased by almost $70 billion it is sure to be given a hard look by the next administration. Especially a administration that wants to reduce budgets. FCS is due to begin initial fielding in 2015 and have 15 brigade fully fielded in 2030. At that time the current combat systems in the Army will be approaching 50 years of service. The FCS program relies heavily on emerging technologies many of which have not been tested in a military environment. The center of gravity for the FCS program is the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) communications network and the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) radio system, neither of which have been field tested. Both have amazing potential but remain unproven. The Army has taken the viewpoint that these technologies married up with the new FCS vehicles and other systems will create a force that no other Army could stand against. Opponents of the FCS have taken the view that WIN-T and JTRS may never be ready and the will cause numerous delays and budget increases. The Army wants this program to continue and even though there have been problems with the FCS, the program must continue because Army combat systems are over 20 years old, and this is the only modernization project in the pipeline.
Should the Army cancel the FCS project? If the FCS is cancelled that would stop the only major combat system development program in the Army. Cancelling the FCS may in the short term be fiscally advantageous for the country, but in the long term disastrous. With combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan ongoing and the potential for each conflict to continue for many more years the cumulative wear and tear on these combat systems is high. Furthermore, with Russia, China and India emerging as regional and world powers the potential for limited or full combat operations against any of those nations is probable. Also, with our combat systems engaged in two conflicts the potential for a future adversary to study weaknesses and develop tactics to overcome our current advantages is likely. The Army needs to develop new combat systems to replace our current fleet and cancelling the FCS program would be catastrophic for the Army in future conflicts.
The FCS program is vital to ensure the Army’s dominance on the battlefield in future conflicts. The question is if the FCS program the correct way to go about modernizing the Army? The main issue with the FCS other than funding is the use emerging and unproven technologies. If the FCS program could incorporate technologies that are proven that may not provide the full potential of WIN-T and JTRS, but a reasonable facsimile we could modernize the force for less money and on a quicker timeline. There are wireless technologies and Internet Protocol (IP) based radio systems the Army is using today in Iraq that could be the gap filler until WIN-T works. These commercial off the shelf (COTs) equipment would be a drastic improvement over current Army communications systems. WIN-T and JTRS need to be fully developed and should stay in the research and development arena (R&D). It is critical to continue with R&D programs and use them to upgrade combat systems as they become available, much like JNN and SINCGARS. Furthermore, the Army needs to begin R&D for a replacement for the M1 Main Battle Tank and all of its helicopters. The need for a main battle tank must not be ignored. Yes, they take longer to deploy but the main battle tank has ruled the battlefield for almost 70 years and in a major conflict they will be required and as good as the M1 is it is getting old. The Army is placing all of its modernization eggs in one basket with the FCS program and that is dangerous.
The Army must go forward with the FCS program, but it should be modified to make use of existing technologies. Removing WIN-T from the FCS program will reduce cost and the amount of time required to field the system. Research and development on WIN-T and JTRS needs to continue but they should not be tied to the FCS program. Also, the Army needs develop replacements for all of its major combat systems.
V/R
MAJ Hugh McCauley
Tuesday, January 20, 2009
Time Travel in a Bottle
All,
During my time at the Command and General Staff College I have been inundated with the concept of achieving balance. Over the long weekend I have discovered the key to achieving balance. Beer, though I was stationed in Germany for five years beginning in 2002, I have only recently discovered the hidden secret only know by brew masters and Albert Einstein.
The current CGSC ratio of class work to home work is one to one so every hour of class time students are expected to conduct one hour of class prep outside of class. That ratio is fine it you are a single introvert who enjoys artificial light and Top Raman noodles for dinner. However your typical CGSC student is between 33 and 37 years of age with 2 children, has deployed at least once and is working on an Advanced Degree, providing little time to relax. Roughly an average day at CGSC is six hours of instruction with another six hours of homework. Roughly twelve hours devoted to CGSC. For those working for a Masters tack on average a four hour block of instruction and two hour block for home work. So our total is 18 hours of self improvement. Include family time 3hrs and sleep your day complete.
Back to the jest of my recent discovery, beer is a time machine. Here is the theory; the person who is drinking a beer has caused the space time continuum to bend slightly thus creating a “Beer Gap”. Once inside the beer gap the beer drinker begins to speak slowly, and have slower reaction time relative to those non-beer drinkers in the general area. The “Beer Gap” is widened by prolong consumption and therefore in order to commutate the beer drinker must yell to compensate for the perceived distance.
John
Time Traveler Extraordinaire
During my time at the Command and General Staff College I have been inundated with the concept of achieving balance. Over the long weekend I have discovered the key to achieving balance. Beer, though I was stationed in Germany for five years beginning in 2002, I have only recently discovered the hidden secret only know by brew masters and Albert Einstein.
The current CGSC ratio of class work to home work is one to one so every hour of class time students are expected to conduct one hour of class prep outside of class. That ratio is fine it you are a single introvert who enjoys artificial light and Top Raman noodles for dinner. However your typical CGSC student is between 33 and 37 years of age with 2 children, has deployed at least once and is working on an Advanced Degree, providing little time to relax. Roughly an average day at CGSC is six hours of instruction with another six hours of homework. Roughly twelve hours devoted to CGSC. For those working for a Masters tack on average a four hour block of instruction and two hour block for home work. So our total is 18 hours of self improvement. Include family time 3hrs and sleep your day complete.
Back to the jest of my recent discovery, beer is a time machine. Here is the theory; the person who is drinking a beer has caused the space time continuum to bend slightly thus creating a “Beer Gap”. Once inside the beer gap the beer drinker begins to speak slowly, and have slower reaction time relative to those non-beer drinkers in the general area. The “Beer Gap” is widened by prolong consumption and therefore in order to commutate the beer drinker must yell to compensate for the perceived distance.
It is within this “Beer Gap” where time lost to CGSC can be regained to accomplish yellow sheets and essays in a record time.
This new miracle in science does not come without some consequences. In order to maintain a “Beer Gap” large amounts of beer must be consumed which may cause severe headaches a temporary aversion to noise, loss of memory and possible motion sickness. All cases are not due to beer but the sever trauma of time travel. So please test my theory and I will be expecting my Nobel Prize for science in the mail with my latest order of sea monkeys.
This new miracle in science does not come without some consequences. In order to maintain a “Beer Gap” large amounts of beer must be consumed which may cause severe headaches a temporary aversion to noise, loss of memory and possible motion sickness. All cases are not due to beer but the sever trauma of time travel. So please test my theory and I will be expecting my Nobel Prize for science in the mail with my latest order of sea monkeys.
John
Time Traveler Extraordinaire
Sunday, December 28, 2008
"Strategic Communication and the Trees"
At first Strategic Communication requirements sounded like just another good idea from the list of many assignments due throughout our time at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) here at FT Leavenworth. But after allowing some time for the concept to sink in, it is clearly present in ways that I had not previously considered. Strategic communication is inherent in every activity we undertake whether it be in our military function or in service to the community. I will examine two examples of how media communication or more precisely the management of information is critical to the outcomes we expect after mission or project is accomplished. The critical aspect of information management is the ability to control your messages while minimizing the negative impact of those seeking to distort, disrupt or manipulate for their own advantage your information. This is especially critical today since most of us get our information from maybe one or two sources, this because most of the time we are overloaded with other issues so we tend to form our opinions based on the limited amount of available filtering time, understanding of the sources, their bias, and ultimately how that makes us susceptible to potential misinformation.
Current media and military relations doctrine involve the process of developing field grade officers into strategic communicators for their organizations. After completing this training I now agree that effective media communication skills are essential in the performance of my duties as a field grade officer. The ability to present clear and concise information and messages in conjunction with the Public Affairs Office is critical in supporting current and future operations of the Army. My first example cites the supporting role of today’s field grade officer as one of the principle organizational communicators for information and command messages to the media.
Effective media communication is the ability of leaders to successfully transmit command messages in order to gain and/or maintain control over circumstances which if not managed correctly could have negative consequences on overall operations and public opinion. A field grade officers understanding of this operational challenge is absolutely essential to the attainment of mission objectives within an Area of Operations (AO). Leaders when given the opportunity to present information must be able to exercise control through their messages to shape and clarify a mission’s task and purpose. Field grade officers have the greatest control over message output since they assist in the planning and development mission objectives for the organization. Therefore, a good leader must be able to unambiguously transmit organizational goals when operations are proceeding according to a plan and more significantly when operations could be perceived as negative.
My first example recounts a case study used in class describing the actions of a support battalion conducting humanitarian operations in Azerbaijan, as students we assumed the role of the Battalion Commander and were required to effectively communicate a series of command messages during a press conference after a civil disturbance occurred at one of our logistical bases. We learned that one of the essential functions of the Commander is to foresee what type of information may be asked before a negative incident occurs. The Commander should ask himself this question. What are my command messages? [1] The practice of determining command messages must be considered part of the daily briefing process and incorporated into all staff planning through the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP). The development of the Public Affairs Estimate and Annex in support of the operations order is critical to the unit’s overall mission. [2] The annex must contain at a minimum the command messages and specific Rules of Engagement (ROE) for conducting media operations. The Public Affairs Annex then acts as a guide for subordinate leaders to pass on the Media ROE and command messages to their soldiers. The higher level Commander’s guidance assists us in formulating a series of command messages in support of our unit’s mission. In the Azerbaijan situation I learned that as the Commander one of my roles is to act as the effective communicator who attempts to maintain control over situations which could have potential negative effects on our operations and public opinion. All the CGSC students had the opportunity to conduct a live press conference complete with cameras and classmates acting as reporters. One key aspect of this event was the Commander’s ability to maintain a calm and confident demeanor during the delivery of an opening statement. Two other important aspects are the need to reemphasize command messages and deliver a clear and concise closing statement prior to taking questions; all these actions when taken together tended to set the tone for a successful press conference. Through this exercise I was able to successfully exhibit the aspects of effective communication by managing the output of information after the civil disturbance. The transmission of information in this case resulted in the decrease in tensions and the prevention of serious damage to public opinion potentially resulting in major changes to the support battalion’s role during our humanitarian aide operation.
My second example references the removal and replacement of the trees at Hasting House on FT Leavenworth for the Girl Scouts as a community service project undertaken by our staff group. This particular project was not military related but as my classmate stated in his blog titled "Tree Camaraderie" we can relate it directly to any potential military project much like the ones being carried out over in Iraq and Afghanistan at this very moment. It requires prior coordination and planning using the MDMP process to ensure a successful outcome for the organization which the activity was originally undertaken. Success is dependent upon meeting the needs of in this case the Girl Scouts, however this could be any public service project carried out overseas. The key ingredient in this is the implied support of the larger community. For instance is the removal and replacement of these trees conducive to the policies of FT Leavenworth and do we have their concurrence. We must be aware of any negative public perception due to other groups or individuals who could be working against us to distort our intention or manipulate public opinion against our proposed actions. In some cases if the project is large enough the town or community will form a committee and hold hearings to allow for public comment before beginning the project. In many cases the project will be put to a vote since it may involve a large sum of money or have an impact life in the community. We have had to learn these lessons the over in Iraq and Afghanistan, and over time we have improved in the ability to strategically communicate our intentions and prevent misinformation. Even though the tree project is relatively simple it carries with it potential ripple effects in the larger community, we could call these 2nd and 3rd order effects. This is where being a critical thinking organizational leader is necessary. I as a field grade officer must understand these subtle interrelationships and be able to for see their effects on my unit, and the community in order to achieve the desired outcome.
As a field grade officer I am the key, on one hand I may act as the spokesman for the organization, for example during an operation or mission, on the other hand I will be the one working with the Public Affairs Office to develop media information and policy for senior level officers. In both of these situations I am acting as the liaison for the organization transmitting messages to the media in order to gain and maintain control over a particular set of circumstances. In our country we are fortunate that our Constitution includes the Freedom of the Press, others are not, this tells us as military leaders that the media has the power to shape and change public opinion. Shifts in public opinion can result in policy changes to military operations. Some policy changes are not always beneficial to our organization. Therefore, in order to assist in the direction and implementation of Army policies is absolutely critical that I continue to develop and improve my media communication skills to become a more effective organizational communicator.
1. 276, “Public Affairs Scenario: Azerbaijan (SASO)”, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, reprint and publication as part of CGSC 2006, C100, Foundations Advance Sheets and Readings, (FT Leavenworth, Kansas, 2008).
2. Kenneth Payne, “The Media as an Instrument of War”, Parameters, US Army War College Quarterly, Volume XXXV, No. 1, (Spring 2005), 85, http://www.carlise.mil/usawc/Parameters/05spring/payne/pdf (accessed 13 August 2008).
MAJ JAMES H. MCLEAN
STUDENT, COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE, U.S. ARMY COMBINED ARMS CENTER, FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS.
See Command Policy #19-08, Combined Arms Center (CAC) Interactive Internet Activities for additional guidance.
The views expressed in this blog are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
Current media and military relations doctrine involve the process of developing field grade officers into strategic communicators for their organizations. After completing this training I now agree that effective media communication skills are essential in the performance of my duties as a field grade officer. The ability to present clear and concise information and messages in conjunction with the Public Affairs Office is critical in supporting current and future operations of the Army. My first example cites the supporting role of today’s field grade officer as one of the principle organizational communicators for information and command messages to the media.
Effective media communication is the ability of leaders to successfully transmit command messages in order to gain and/or maintain control over circumstances which if not managed correctly could have negative consequences on overall operations and public opinion. A field grade officers understanding of this operational challenge is absolutely essential to the attainment of mission objectives within an Area of Operations (AO). Leaders when given the opportunity to present information must be able to exercise control through their messages to shape and clarify a mission’s task and purpose. Field grade officers have the greatest control over message output since they assist in the planning and development mission objectives for the organization. Therefore, a good leader must be able to unambiguously transmit organizational goals when operations are proceeding according to a plan and more significantly when operations could be perceived as negative.
My first example recounts a case study used in class describing the actions of a support battalion conducting humanitarian operations in Azerbaijan, as students we assumed the role of the Battalion Commander and were required to effectively communicate a series of command messages during a press conference after a civil disturbance occurred at one of our logistical bases. We learned that one of the essential functions of the Commander is to foresee what type of information may be asked before a negative incident occurs. The Commander should ask himself this question. What are my command messages? [1] The practice of determining command messages must be considered part of the daily briefing process and incorporated into all staff planning through the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP). The development of the Public Affairs Estimate and Annex in support of the operations order is critical to the unit’s overall mission. [2] The annex must contain at a minimum the command messages and specific Rules of Engagement (ROE) for conducting media operations. The Public Affairs Annex then acts as a guide for subordinate leaders to pass on the Media ROE and command messages to their soldiers. The higher level Commander’s guidance assists us in formulating a series of command messages in support of our unit’s mission. In the Azerbaijan situation I learned that as the Commander one of my roles is to act as the effective communicator who attempts to maintain control over situations which could have potential negative effects on our operations and public opinion. All the CGSC students had the opportunity to conduct a live press conference complete with cameras and classmates acting as reporters. One key aspect of this event was the Commander’s ability to maintain a calm and confident demeanor during the delivery of an opening statement. Two other important aspects are the need to reemphasize command messages and deliver a clear and concise closing statement prior to taking questions; all these actions when taken together tended to set the tone for a successful press conference. Through this exercise I was able to successfully exhibit the aspects of effective communication by managing the output of information after the civil disturbance. The transmission of information in this case resulted in the decrease in tensions and the prevention of serious damage to public opinion potentially resulting in major changes to the support battalion’s role during our humanitarian aide operation.
My second example references the removal and replacement of the trees at Hasting House on FT Leavenworth for the Girl Scouts as a community service project undertaken by our staff group. This particular project was not military related but as my classmate stated in his blog titled "Tree Camaraderie" we can relate it directly to any potential military project much like the ones being carried out over in Iraq and Afghanistan at this very moment. It requires prior coordination and planning using the MDMP process to ensure a successful outcome for the organization which the activity was originally undertaken. Success is dependent upon meeting the needs of in this case the Girl Scouts, however this could be any public service project carried out overseas. The key ingredient in this is the implied support of the larger community. For instance is the removal and replacement of these trees conducive to the policies of FT Leavenworth and do we have their concurrence. We must be aware of any negative public perception due to other groups or individuals who could be working against us to distort our intention or manipulate public opinion against our proposed actions. In some cases if the project is large enough the town or community will form a committee and hold hearings to allow for public comment before beginning the project. In many cases the project will be put to a vote since it may involve a large sum of money or have an impact life in the community. We have had to learn these lessons the over in Iraq and Afghanistan, and over time we have improved in the ability to strategically communicate our intentions and prevent misinformation. Even though the tree project is relatively simple it carries with it potential ripple effects in the larger community, we could call these 2nd and 3rd order effects. This is where being a critical thinking organizational leader is necessary. I as a field grade officer must understand these subtle interrelationships and be able to for see their effects on my unit, and the community in order to achieve the desired outcome.
As a field grade officer I am the key, on one hand I may act as the spokesman for the organization, for example during an operation or mission, on the other hand I will be the one working with the Public Affairs Office to develop media information and policy for senior level officers. In both of these situations I am acting as the liaison for the organization transmitting messages to the media in order to gain and maintain control over a particular set of circumstances. In our country we are fortunate that our Constitution includes the Freedom of the Press, others are not, this tells us as military leaders that the media has the power to shape and change public opinion. Shifts in public opinion can result in policy changes to military operations. Some policy changes are not always beneficial to our organization. Therefore, in order to assist in the direction and implementation of Army policies is absolutely critical that I continue to develop and improve my media communication skills to become a more effective organizational communicator.
1. 276, “Public Affairs Scenario: Azerbaijan (SASO)”, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, reprint and publication as part of CGSC 2006, C100, Foundations Advance Sheets and Readings, (FT Leavenworth, Kansas, 2008).
2. Kenneth Payne, “The Media as an Instrument of War”, Parameters, US Army War College Quarterly, Volume XXXV, No. 1, (Spring 2005), 85, http://www.carlise.mil/usawc/Parameters/05spring/payne/pdf (accessed 13 August 2008).
MAJ JAMES H. MCLEAN
STUDENT, COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE, U.S. ARMY COMBINED ARMS CENTER, FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS.
See Command Policy #19-08, Combined Arms Center (CAC) Interactive Internet Activities for additional guidance.
The views expressed in this blog are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
Monday, December 15, 2008
Integrity: The Hard Right vs. The Easy Left
Instilling the values that I hold true and practice in everyday life are critical to the success of any organization or small group. However, of all the values a good leader must possess, integrity is the most important because it transcends the size of any organization. I know because my integrity has been challenged in both a big a small organization.
I define integrity as choosing what is right even if it means losing a popularity contest with your subordinates. I have tested the definition of this value both as a company commander, responsible for 120 soldiers, and as a civil affairs team leader, in charge of three senior NCOs. In both situations, I have made decisions that, in the short run, were unpopular, but paid off dividends in the end. As a company commander, I was told by the Brigade Sergeants Major (SGM) that, by regulation, when soldiers go to the field, they must have their separate rations taken away; however, the SGM went on to say that “it was no big deal though…..all commanders on this post let their soldiers keep their separate rats”. After researching the regulation, I found that it was indeed true. I immediately enacted the paperwork to stop everyone’s separate rations before the next field problem. As a result, word spread around the brigade that I was taking money from soldiers. Senior NCOs and some officers pressured me to change this policy. I resisted, stating that this is the regulation and I must abide.
A couple of months after my policy correction, a no-notice inspection team from Ft Bragg, NC showed up at my brigade. Their mission was to inspect all administrative areas. The team went through every company leaving no rock left unturned. One of the “rocks” was rations paperwork for field problems. As a result, many of my fellow company commanders received counseling statements due to their negligence of the separate rations regulation. On the other hand, my company was recognized for correcting a systemic problem with separate rations throughout the brigade.
The principles of integrity also play a role on a team. As a team leader in charge of three senior NCOs in Afghanistan, I had the responsibility for small scale civic projects throughout a very remote province. At the time, only a handful of Coalition Forces were operating in this province. My team was given a lot of cash in order to contract for projects. Initially, we were given a lot of latitude in terms of what we kind of projects we could initiate with the money. As the Coalition command structure in the province matured over the last months of the tour, however, limitations on the scope of projects were imposed for oversight reasons.
In our last months in country, my team initiated a contract to build a school in a village that desperately needed a facility. My team developed quite a rapport with the local populace, many of whom were once Taliban. This project would aid the change in their perceptions of Americans. Unfortunately, just after the agreement had been with the local contractor, the Coalition refined the project guidance stating that schools could built only with funds that my team did not possess. Against the advise of my NCOs, I had no choice than to call off the project. There was no doubt the locals were upset and my men had lost confidence in me. My team sergeant told me that the school village was so far out in the “middle of nowhere” no one will ever know. Despite the pressures of my NCOs and the local populace, I knew that I made the right ethical choice.
Months later, after my team had redeployed, our project budget for Afghanistan was audited. I later found out that in response to large-scale abuse of project funds, the Coalition sent inspectors throughout the Afghani countryside to ensure money was spent properly. As a result, many officers and NCOs lost careers over misallocation of funds. My team, however, was spared. Taking the “hard right” is never easy, but have to deal with the potential implications of the “easy left” is worse.
As a company commander, I had to take money away from soldiers who were raised in an environment in which leaders did not want to make hard choices. As a team leader, I had to delay the effects of winning hearts and minds of the local populace and admiration of my NCOs to ensure project money allocation fell within regulation. In the end, however, keeping my integrity prevented soldiers from getting money taken out of their paychecks and senior NCOs from losing their careers. From these experiences and many others, not as dramatic, I have realized that integrity is a value that is hard maintain during struggling times, but it always pays dividends in the end.
I define integrity as choosing what is right even if it means losing a popularity contest with your subordinates. I have tested the definition of this value both as a company commander, responsible for 120 soldiers, and as a civil affairs team leader, in charge of three senior NCOs. In both situations, I have made decisions that, in the short run, were unpopular, but paid off dividends in the end. As a company commander, I was told by the Brigade Sergeants Major (SGM) that, by regulation, when soldiers go to the field, they must have their separate rations taken away; however, the SGM went on to say that “it was no big deal though…..all commanders on this post let their soldiers keep their separate rats”. After researching the regulation, I found that it was indeed true. I immediately enacted the paperwork to stop everyone’s separate rations before the next field problem. As a result, word spread around the brigade that I was taking money from soldiers. Senior NCOs and some officers pressured me to change this policy. I resisted, stating that this is the regulation and I must abide.
A couple of months after my policy correction, a no-notice inspection team from Ft Bragg, NC showed up at my brigade. Their mission was to inspect all administrative areas. The team went through every company leaving no rock left unturned. One of the “rocks” was rations paperwork for field problems. As a result, many of my fellow company commanders received counseling statements due to their negligence of the separate rations regulation. On the other hand, my company was recognized for correcting a systemic problem with separate rations throughout the brigade.
The principles of integrity also play a role on a team. As a team leader in charge of three senior NCOs in Afghanistan, I had the responsibility for small scale civic projects throughout a very remote province. At the time, only a handful of Coalition Forces were operating in this province. My team was given a lot of cash in order to contract for projects. Initially, we were given a lot of latitude in terms of what we kind of projects we could initiate with the money. As the Coalition command structure in the province matured over the last months of the tour, however, limitations on the scope of projects were imposed for oversight reasons.
In our last months in country, my team initiated a contract to build a school in a village that desperately needed a facility. My team developed quite a rapport with the local populace, many of whom were once Taliban. This project would aid the change in their perceptions of Americans. Unfortunately, just after the agreement had been with the local contractor, the Coalition refined the project guidance stating that schools could built only with funds that my team did not possess. Against the advise of my NCOs, I had no choice than to call off the project. There was no doubt the locals were upset and my men had lost confidence in me. My team sergeant told me that the school village was so far out in the “middle of nowhere” no one will ever know. Despite the pressures of my NCOs and the local populace, I knew that I made the right ethical choice.
Months later, after my team had redeployed, our project budget for Afghanistan was audited. I later found out that in response to large-scale abuse of project funds, the Coalition sent inspectors throughout the Afghani countryside to ensure money was spent properly. As a result, many officers and NCOs lost careers over misallocation of funds. My team, however, was spared. Taking the “hard right” is never easy, but have to deal with the potential implications of the “easy left” is worse.
As a company commander, I had to take money away from soldiers who were raised in an environment in which leaders did not want to make hard choices. As a team leader, I had to delay the effects of winning hearts and minds of the local populace and admiration of my NCOs to ensure project money allocation fell within regulation. In the end, however, keeping my integrity prevented soldiers from getting money taken out of their paychecks and senior NCOs from losing their careers. From these experiences and many others, not as dramatic, I have realized that integrity is a value that is hard maintain during struggling times, but it always pays dividends in the end.
This posting does not nessecarily reflect the official stance of the United States Army. This is my own work and reflects my opinion.
Friday, December 12, 2008
Tree Camaraderie
It started out like any other tasking in CGSC. All CGSC students were given the dubious task of completing STRATCOM requirements. One of the specific tasks of STRATCOM is to complete a community engagement. Most of us struggled with what to do in order to complete our community engagement. MAJ Thomas Laybourn had fortunately received a request from the Girls Scouts on Ft. Leavenworth to remove some dead trees from in front of the Hasting House. The Hasting House is a remodeled stable from the early days of Ft Leavenworth build in the1930s. The Hasting House is a historic building the Girl Scouts use to have their meetings. I knew about the building because my daughter is a Girl Scout.
After the offer was made by Tom we had to decide the best time to remove the trees. We went through an extensive military decision making process (MDMP) to identify the endstate, objectives and key task. After much deliberation, we decided on the appropriate weekend and meet at the PX on Ft Leavenworth.
There were about nine of us that volunteered our Saturday to help. We had some serious logging tools like axes, saws, rope and shovels--not to mention a Toyota Tundra truck for pulling. Once we arrived at the Hasting House we identified the five trees that needed to be removed, and went immediately to work. The first few trees we removed gave us the impression the task would be easy and we would make quick work of the remaining trees.
We chopped, pushed, and pulled trees that were about three to four inches thick in diameter. While we had success initially the last tree was not as cooperative. As we continued I began to ask myself how many Army Majors does it take to remove a tree? We obviously needed some expert help. It ended up taking an hour of chopping, digging, pushing, pulling on that one tree. What I did not mention was that we tied the begrudging tree to the aforementioned Toyota. Needless to say the tree won that round. Thank goodness, we did not pull the truck apart.
After several different approaches, techniques and deliberation about removing the tree we had an epiphany. We dug around the tree some more and found out there was still a live root at the base of the tree. It took about four or five good chops to remove stubborn root.
After our accomplishments we took a photo as proof of the obstinate tree. Proud of our accomplishments and ourselves we stood around and talked about class, deployments, future jobs, family and of course that last tree. We all felt a since of camaraderie and accomplishment you just do not get from conducting the awe inspiring MDMP.
We concluded with putting all the dirt back in the holes and having some cold beers as a well deserved reward. I look forward to the final phase of planting new trees in the spring. I’m sure we will have as much fun planting as we did pulling up the trees along with the since of satisfaction that we came together as a class and helped the community in the process. You always learn more about yourself and others when you work outside the confines of the classroom.
In conclusion, I had a great time tackling the project with my classmate and have the scars on my shoulders to prove it. We not only completed our community engagement for our STRATCOM requirement we all bonded and felt good about helping the community.
After the offer was made by Tom we had to decide the best time to remove the trees. We went through an extensive military decision making process (MDMP) to identify the endstate, objectives and key task. After much deliberation, we decided on the appropriate weekend and meet at the PX on Ft Leavenworth.
There were about nine of us that volunteered our Saturday to help. We had some serious logging tools like axes, saws, rope and shovels--not to mention a Toyota Tundra truck for pulling. Once we arrived at the Hasting House we identified the five trees that needed to be removed, and went immediately to work. The first few trees we removed gave us the impression the task would be easy and we would make quick work of the remaining trees.
We chopped, pushed, and pulled trees that were about three to four inches thick in diameter. While we had success initially the last tree was not as cooperative. As we continued I began to ask myself how many Army Majors does it take to remove a tree? We obviously needed some expert help. It ended up taking an hour of chopping, digging, pushing, pulling on that one tree. What I did not mention was that we tied the begrudging tree to the aforementioned Toyota. Needless to say the tree won that round. Thank goodness, we did not pull the truck apart.
After several different approaches, techniques and deliberation about removing the tree we had an epiphany. We dug around the tree some more and found out there was still a live root at the base of the tree. It took about four or five good chops to remove stubborn root.
After our accomplishments we took a photo as proof of the obstinate tree. Proud of our accomplishments and ourselves we stood around and talked about class, deployments, future jobs, family and of course that last tree. We all felt a since of camaraderie and accomplishment you just do not get from conducting the awe inspiring MDMP.
We concluded with putting all the dirt back in the holes and having some cold beers as a well deserved reward. I look forward to the final phase of planting new trees in the spring. I’m sure we will have as much fun planting as we did pulling up the trees along with the since of satisfaction that we came together as a class and helped the community in the process. You always learn more about yourself and others when you work outside the confines of the classroom.
In conclusion, I had a great time tackling the project with my classmate and have the scars on my shoulders to prove it. We not only completed our community engagement for our STRATCOM requirement we all bonded and felt good about helping the community.
Thursday, December 11, 2008
Modernizing the USAF--"Cutting Edge" or "Good Enough?"
by Maj Chris McMartin, USAF
NOTE: The following is the opinion of the author and does not necessarily reflect the views, policy, or opinion of the Department of Defense or United States Air Force.
The United States Air Force in its various incarnations has enjoyed a technological advantage over every other nation’s air arm practically since the dawn of powered flight. Since World War Two, this advantage has come at an increasing cost, to the point where in 2005 the Air Force was willing to reduce its personnel end strength by 40,000 Airmen, in part to justify the purchase of a few additional fighters.[i] It is imperative the incoming Presidential Administration reverse this trend. The Administration should opt instead to recapitalize the Air Force by purchasing “sufficient” advanced weapon systems instead of absolute cutting-edge technology. In doing so, the Air Force will be able to afford both more aircraft more often as well as more personnel. The effects will be reduced fatigue and operations tempo, and a more rapid technology deployment cycle to better keep up with changing threats.
The trend in spiraling costs for military aircraft is not new. Three decades ago, an Air Force major lamented the fact that, despite technology typically driving prices down (as in the case of automobiles), fighter aircraft cost eight times as much per pound by the 1970s as they did in World War Two—a cost increase six times as high as that for commercial aircraft.[ii] His suggestion was to pay several aircraft manufacturers an annual fee to develop new aircraft regularly, in order to keep development costs down. I suggest a different approach, more attuned to the computer age.
Moore’s Law from 1965 stipulates the number of transistors on a computer chip (and, by extension, computing power) doubles every 24 months. This hypothesis has proven true over the last 40-plus years.[iii] An end-user corollary is that no matter what computer a consumer buys, it will be obsolete in two years. This has led some industry pundits to advise consumers to purchase as much computer as they can possibly afford, so that it will not go obsolete as quickly as a cheaper (and presumably less-powerful) model. The consequence of such a decision is to hold on to that expensive computer as long as possible to “get the consumer’s money’s worth,” even though by the time it is finally retired it is several generations behind the current technology. The Air Force’s current inventory, which includes KC-135s and B-52s—both designs over 50 years old—seems to reflect this mentality.
However, a different school of thought posits that buying only sufficient computing power needed at the time is more efficient, as not only will the purchase be cheaper, the difference in price can be applied toward a more powerful model as the newer technology’s price decreases in the future. This concept can easily translate into military aircraft purchases.
A combination of superior technology and superior crew training gives the United States its decisive edge in air power. The technology advantage has typically been very large, though the Former Soviet Union made great strides in this respect during the 1980s and 1990s with their fourth- and fifth-generation fighters. Given the absence of this peer competitor, and the next peer competitor (China) still lagging in the technological realm, the Air Force needs simply to buy aircraft that are “good enough” to preserve a small, but still present, technological advantage. The cost savings realized by this approach would free up funds to allocate towards near-term future aircraft purchases, instead of being committed to maintaining outdated technology for a longer period of time.
Not only would this approach to aircraft procurement allow for more rapid “technology refreshes” than current practice; the reduced cost would provide funding for more individual aircraft as well as more personnel in the force. This would have a two-pronged effect.
First, the Air Force would be more flexible in that it could operate in more theaters simultaneously. Currently, because each type of aircraft costs so much (not just fighters, but support aircraft such as C-17s), fewer of each type are produced. An aircraft cannot be in two locations at once, so the lower numbers of aircraft must be prioritized as to which theater will receive their services (a prime example today is the “low density/high demand” concept evident in most ISR platforms). Having more aircraft available also means individual aircraft would not have to fly as many hours as they currently sustain, thereby increasing their service life. The War on Terror has already shortened the programmed service life of C-17s to the point that analysts say up to three times the originally-budgeted number of planes will be needed to sustain combat support operations.[iv]
Second, an addition in personnel end strength would reduce operations tempo. This year the Air Force announced a restructuring of its Aerospace Expeditionary Force (AEF) concept, which initially entailed a 1:4 dwell ratio (4 months deployed, 16 months at home station), to reflect the reality of many personnel in “stressed” career fields experiencing a 1:1 dwell (in some cases, 6 months deployed, 6 months at home station ad infinitum).[v] While the move was meant to better align the AEF cycle with joint planning constraints, it tacitly acknowledges the increasing operations tempo for career fields suffering a decline in their experienced personnel (for example, Security Forces) due to both voluntary and involuntary separations. Thankfully, Secretary of Defense put an end to the 40,000-troop force reduction in progress and proposed increasing end strength in the next few years.[vi] Future savings from buying sufficient rather than cutting-edge aircraft would enable the Air Force to build back up to previous personnel levels, helping to alleviate the pain in these stressed career fields.
Critics of this proposal to buy “good enough” vs. “absolute best” aircraft may worry about falling behind technologically. However, as previously mentioned, the Air Force’s advantage comes not only from superior equipment but superior training. General “Buster” Ellis, former commander 19th Air Force (Air Education and Training Command), extols the virtues of America’s superior pilot training—a combination of instructor ability and simulators.[vii]
The synergy offered by the combination of superior training and the proposed “sufficiently” advanced aircraft will maintain the United States Air Force’s combat edge and, more importantly, will allow for aircraft refresh cycles to be greatly reduced—clearly an advantage when working to counter an ever-changing threat scenario.
Military aircraft costs have increased too quickly for too long. The next Presidential Administration has a golden opportunity to reverse this trend and argue for sufficiency rather than cutting-edge technology for the next generation of aircraft. The savings realized can be immediately put to use in rejuvenating personnel end strength, reducing operations tempo in critical career fields, and purchasing more aircraft, extending service life for the entire fleet. In the long term, the ability to develop and field new aircraft using the savings from buying “good enough” aircraft now will pay dividends in allowing the Air Force to recapitalize its inventory more often to counter constantly changing adversaries worldwide.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[i] Wynne, Michael W. and General T. Michael Moseley. Air Force Posture Statement 2008, page 18.
[ii] Stark, Major Frederick T. “Why Military Airplanes Cost So Much and What Can Be Done About It.” Air University Review, Nov-Dec 1973.
[iii] “Moore’s Law—Made Real by Intel Innovation.” http://www.intel.com/technology/mooreslaw/; accessed 20 Oct 2008.
[iv] “Air Transportation” 17 April 2005. Strategy Page web site. http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htairmo/articles/20050417.aspx; accessed 20 Oct 2008.
[v] Wicke, TSgt Russell. “AEF Evolves for Stressed Career Fields.” Air Force Link, 02 June 2008. http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123101035; accessed 20 Oct 2008.
[vi] Randolph, SSgt Monique. “Air Force Charts New Course for 2009 Force Shaping.” Air Force Link, 12 June 2008. http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123102609; accessed 20 Oct 2008.
[vii] Miles, Donna. “Aircrew Training Ensures U.S. Air Superiority.” American Forces Press Service, 07 Sep 2004. http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=25383; accessed 20 Oct 2008.
NOTE: The following is the opinion of the author and does not necessarily reflect the views, policy, or opinion of the Department of Defense or United States Air Force.
The United States Air Force in its various incarnations has enjoyed a technological advantage over every other nation’s air arm practically since the dawn of powered flight. Since World War Two, this advantage has come at an increasing cost, to the point where in 2005 the Air Force was willing to reduce its personnel end strength by 40,000 Airmen, in part to justify the purchase of a few additional fighters.[i] It is imperative the incoming Presidential Administration reverse this trend. The Administration should opt instead to recapitalize the Air Force by purchasing “sufficient” advanced weapon systems instead of absolute cutting-edge technology. In doing so, the Air Force will be able to afford both more aircraft more often as well as more personnel. The effects will be reduced fatigue and operations tempo, and a more rapid technology deployment cycle to better keep up with changing threats.
The trend in spiraling costs for military aircraft is not new. Three decades ago, an Air Force major lamented the fact that, despite technology typically driving prices down (as in the case of automobiles), fighter aircraft cost eight times as much per pound by the 1970s as they did in World War Two—a cost increase six times as high as that for commercial aircraft.[ii] His suggestion was to pay several aircraft manufacturers an annual fee to develop new aircraft regularly, in order to keep development costs down. I suggest a different approach, more attuned to the computer age.
Moore’s Law from 1965 stipulates the number of transistors on a computer chip (and, by extension, computing power) doubles every 24 months. This hypothesis has proven true over the last 40-plus years.[iii] An end-user corollary is that no matter what computer a consumer buys, it will be obsolete in two years. This has led some industry pundits to advise consumers to purchase as much computer as they can possibly afford, so that it will not go obsolete as quickly as a cheaper (and presumably less-powerful) model. The consequence of such a decision is to hold on to that expensive computer as long as possible to “get the consumer’s money’s worth,” even though by the time it is finally retired it is several generations behind the current technology. The Air Force’s current inventory, which includes KC-135s and B-52s—both designs over 50 years old—seems to reflect this mentality.
However, a different school of thought posits that buying only sufficient computing power needed at the time is more efficient, as not only will the purchase be cheaper, the difference in price can be applied toward a more powerful model as the newer technology’s price decreases in the future. This concept can easily translate into military aircraft purchases.
A combination of superior technology and superior crew training gives the United States its decisive edge in air power. The technology advantage has typically been very large, though the Former Soviet Union made great strides in this respect during the 1980s and 1990s with their fourth- and fifth-generation fighters. Given the absence of this peer competitor, and the next peer competitor (China) still lagging in the technological realm, the Air Force needs simply to buy aircraft that are “good enough” to preserve a small, but still present, technological advantage. The cost savings realized by this approach would free up funds to allocate towards near-term future aircraft purchases, instead of being committed to maintaining outdated technology for a longer period of time.
Not only would this approach to aircraft procurement allow for more rapid “technology refreshes” than current practice; the reduced cost would provide funding for more individual aircraft as well as more personnel in the force. This would have a two-pronged effect.
First, the Air Force would be more flexible in that it could operate in more theaters simultaneously. Currently, because each type of aircraft costs so much (not just fighters, but support aircraft such as C-17s), fewer of each type are produced. An aircraft cannot be in two locations at once, so the lower numbers of aircraft must be prioritized as to which theater will receive their services (a prime example today is the “low density/high demand” concept evident in most ISR platforms). Having more aircraft available also means individual aircraft would not have to fly as many hours as they currently sustain, thereby increasing their service life. The War on Terror has already shortened the programmed service life of C-17s to the point that analysts say up to three times the originally-budgeted number of planes will be needed to sustain combat support operations.[iv]
Second, an addition in personnel end strength would reduce operations tempo. This year the Air Force announced a restructuring of its Aerospace Expeditionary Force (AEF) concept, which initially entailed a 1:4 dwell ratio (4 months deployed, 16 months at home station), to reflect the reality of many personnel in “stressed” career fields experiencing a 1:1 dwell (in some cases, 6 months deployed, 6 months at home station ad infinitum).[v] While the move was meant to better align the AEF cycle with joint planning constraints, it tacitly acknowledges the increasing operations tempo for career fields suffering a decline in their experienced personnel (for example, Security Forces) due to both voluntary and involuntary separations. Thankfully, Secretary of Defense put an end to the 40,000-troop force reduction in progress and proposed increasing end strength in the next few years.[vi] Future savings from buying sufficient rather than cutting-edge aircraft would enable the Air Force to build back up to previous personnel levels, helping to alleviate the pain in these stressed career fields.
Critics of this proposal to buy “good enough” vs. “absolute best” aircraft may worry about falling behind technologically. However, as previously mentioned, the Air Force’s advantage comes not only from superior equipment but superior training. General “Buster” Ellis, former commander 19th Air Force (Air Education and Training Command), extols the virtues of America’s superior pilot training—a combination of instructor ability and simulators.[vii]
The synergy offered by the combination of superior training and the proposed “sufficiently” advanced aircraft will maintain the United States Air Force’s combat edge and, more importantly, will allow for aircraft refresh cycles to be greatly reduced—clearly an advantage when working to counter an ever-changing threat scenario.
Military aircraft costs have increased too quickly for too long. The next Presidential Administration has a golden opportunity to reverse this trend and argue for sufficiency rather than cutting-edge technology for the next generation of aircraft. The savings realized can be immediately put to use in rejuvenating personnel end strength, reducing operations tempo in critical career fields, and purchasing more aircraft, extending service life for the entire fleet. In the long term, the ability to develop and field new aircraft using the savings from buying “good enough” aircraft now will pay dividends in allowing the Air Force to recapitalize its inventory more often to counter constantly changing adversaries worldwide.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[i] Wynne, Michael W. and General T. Michael Moseley. Air Force Posture Statement 2008, page 18.
[ii] Stark, Major Frederick T. “Why Military Airplanes Cost So Much and What Can Be Done About It.” Air University Review, Nov-Dec 1973.
[iii] “Moore’s Law—Made Real by Intel Innovation.” http://www.intel.com/technology/mooreslaw/; accessed 20 Oct 2008.
[iv] “Air Transportation” 17 April 2005. Strategy Page web site. http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htairmo/articles/20050417.aspx; accessed 20 Oct 2008.
[v] Wicke, TSgt Russell. “AEF Evolves for Stressed Career Fields.” Air Force Link, 02 June 2008. http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123101035; accessed 20 Oct 2008.
[vi] Randolph, SSgt Monique. “Air Force Charts New Course for 2009 Force Shaping.” Air Force Link, 12 June 2008. http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123102609; accessed 20 Oct 2008.
[vii] Miles, Donna. “Aircrew Training Ensures U.S. Air Superiority.” American Forces Press Service, 07 Sep 2004. http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=25383; accessed 20 Oct 2008.
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