At first Strategic Communication requirements sounded like just another good idea from the list of many assignments due throughout our time at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) here at FT Leavenworth. But after allowing some time for the concept to sink in, it is clearly present in ways that I had not previously considered. Strategic communication is inherent in every activity we undertake whether it be in our military function or in service to the community. I will examine two examples of how media communication or more precisely the management of information is critical to the outcomes we expect after mission or project is accomplished. The critical aspect of information management is the ability to control your messages while minimizing the negative impact of those seeking to distort, disrupt or manipulate for their own advantage your information. This is especially critical today since most of us get our information from maybe one or two sources, this because most of the time we are overloaded with other issues so we tend to form our opinions based on the limited amount of available filtering time, understanding of the sources, their bias, and ultimately how that makes us susceptible to potential misinformation.
Current media and military relations doctrine involve the process of developing field grade officers into strategic communicators for their organizations. After completing this training I now agree that effective media communication skills are essential in the performance of my duties as a field grade officer. The ability to present clear and concise information and messages in conjunction with the Public Affairs Office is critical in supporting current and future operations of the Army. My first example cites the supporting role of today’s field grade officer as one of the principle organizational communicators for information and command messages to the media.
Effective media communication is the ability of leaders to successfully transmit command messages in order to gain and/or maintain control over circumstances which if not managed correctly could have negative consequences on overall operations and public opinion. A field grade officers understanding of this operational challenge is absolutely essential to the attainment of mission objectives within an Area of Operations (AO). Leaders when given the opportunity to present information must be able to exercise control through their messages to shape and clarify a mission’s task and purpose. Field grade officers have the greatest control over message output since they assist in the planning and development mission objectives for the organization. Therefore, a good leader must be able to unambiguously transmit organizational goals when operations are proceeding according to a plan and more significantly when operations could be perceived as negative.
My first example recounts a case study used in class describing the actions of a support battalion conducting humanitarian operations in Azerbaijan, as students we assumed the role of the Battalion Commander and were required to effectively communicate a series of command messages during a press conference after a civil disturbance occurred at one of our logistical bases. We learned that one of the essential functions of the Commander is to foresee what type of information may be asked before a negative incident occurs. The Commander should ask himself this question. What are my command messages? [1] The practice of determining command messages must be considered part of the daily briefing process and incorporated into all staff planning through the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP). The development of the Public Affairs Estimate and Annex in support of the operations order is critical to the unit’s overall mission. [2] The annex must contain at a minimum the command messages and specific Rules of Engagement (ROE) for conducting media operations. The Public Affairs Annex then acts as a guide for subordinate leaders to pass on the Media ROE and command messages to their soldiers. The higher level Commander’s guidance assists us in formulating a series of command messages in support of our unit’s mission. In the Azerbaijan situation I learned that as the Commander one of my roles is to act as the effective communicator who attempts to maintain control over situations which could have potential negative effects on our operations and public opinion. All the CGSC students had the opportunity to conduct a live press conference complete with cameras and classmates acting as reporters. One key aspect of this event was the Commander’s ability to maintain a calm and confident demeanor during the delivery of an opening statement. Two other important aspects are the need to reemphasize command messages and deliver a clear and concise closing statement prior to taking questions; all these actions when taken together tended to set the tone for a successful press conference. Through this exercise I was able to successfully exhibit the aspects of effective communication by managing the output of information after the civil disturbance. The transmission of information in this case resulted in the decrease in tensions and the prevention of serious damage to public opinion potentially resulting in major changes to the support battalion’s role during our humanitarian aide operation.
My second example references the removal and replacement of the trees at Hasting House on FT Leavenworth for the Girl Scouts as a community service project undertaken by our staff group. This particular project was not military related but as my classmate stated in his blog titled "Tree Camaraderie" we can relate it directly to any potential military project much like the ones being carried out over in Iraq and Afghanistan at this very moment. It requires prior coordination and planning using the MDMP process to ensure a successful outcome for the organization which the activity was originally undertaken. Success is dependent upon meeting the needs of in this case the Girl Scouts, however this could be any public service project carried out overseas. The key ingredient in this is the implied support of the larger community. For instance is the removal and replacement of these trees conducive to the policies of FT Leavenworth and do we have their concurrence. We must be aware of any negative public perception due to other groups or individuals who could be working against us to distort our intention or manipulate public opinion against our proposed actions. In some cases if the project is large enough the town or community will form a committee and hold hearings to allow for public comment before beginning the project. In many cases the project will be put to a vote since it may involve a large sum of money or have an impact life in the community. We have had to learn these lessons the over in Iraq and Afghanistan, and over time we have improved in the ability to strategically communicate our intentions and prevent misinformation. Even though the tree project is relatively simple it carries with it potential ripple effects in the larger community, we could call these 2nd and 3rd order effects. This is where being a critical thinking organizational leader is necessary. I as a field grade officer must understand these subtle interrelationships and be able to for see their effects on my unit, and the community in order to achieve the desired outcome.
As a field grade officer I am the key, on one hand I may act as the spokesman for the organization, for example during an operation or mission, on the other hand I will be the one working with the Public Affairs Office to develop media information and policy for senior level officers. In both of these situations I am acting as the liaison for the organization transmitting messages to the media in order to gain and maintain control over a particular set of circumstances. In our country we are fortunate that our Constitution includes the Freedom of the Press, others are not, this tells us as military leaders that the media has the power to shape and change public opinion. Shifts in public opinion can result in policy changes to military operations. Some policy changes are not always beneficial to our organization. Therefore, in order to assist in the direction and implementation of Army policies is absolutely critical that I continue to develop and improve my media communication skills to become a more effective organizational communicator.
1. 276, “Public Affairs Scenario: Azerbaijan (SASO)”, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, reprint and publication as part of CGSC 2006, C100, Foundations Advance Sheets and Readings, (FT Leavenworth, Kansas, 2008).
2. Kenneth Payne, “The Media as an Instrument of War”, Parameters, US Army War College Quarterly, Volume XXXV, No. 1, (Spring 2005), 85, http://www.carlise.mil/usawc/Parameters/05spring/payne/pdf (accessed 13 August 2008).
MAJ JAMES H. MCLEAN
STUDENT, COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE, U.S. ARMY COMBINED ARMS CENTER, FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS.
See Command Policy #19-08, Combined Arms Center (CAC) Interactive Internet Activities for additional guidance.
The views expressed in this blog are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
Sunday, December 28, 2008
Monday, December 15, 2008
Integrity: The Hard Right vs. The Easy Left
Instilling the values that I hold true and practice in everyday life are critical to the success of any organization or small group. However, of all the values a good leader must possess, integrity is the most important because it transcends the size of any organization. I know because my integrity has been challenged in both a big a small organization.
I define integrity as choosing what is right even if it means losing a popularity contest with your subordinates. I have tested the definition of this value both as a company commander, responsible for 120 soldiers, and as a civil affairs team leader, in charge of three senior NCOs. In both situations, I have made decisions that, in the short run, were unpopular, but paid off dividends in the end. As a company commander, I was told by the Brigade Sergeants Major (SGM) that, by regulation, when soldiers go to the field, they must have their separate rations taken away; however, the SGM went on to say that “it was no big deal though…..all commanders on this post let their soldiers keep their separate rats”. After researching the regulation, I found that it was indeed true. I immediately enacted the paperwork to stop everyone’s separate rations before the next field problem. As a result, word spread around the brigade that I was taking money from soldiers. Senior NCOs and some officers pressured me to change this policy. I resisted, stating that this is the regulation and I must abide.
A couple of months after my policy correction, a no-notice inspection team from Ft Bragg, NC showed up at my brigade. Their mission was to inspect all administrative areas. The team went through every company leaving no rock left unturned. One of the “rocks” was rations paperwork for field problems. As a result, many of my fellow company commanders received counseling statements due to their negligence of the separate rations regulation. On the other hand, my company was recognized for correcting a systemic problem with separate rations throughout the brigade.
The principles of integrity also play a role on a team. As a team leader in charge of three senior NCOs in Afghanistan, I had the responsibility for small scale civic projects throughout a very remote province. At the time, only a handful of Coalition Forces were operating in this province. My team was given a lot of cash in order to contract for projects. Initially, we were given a lot of latitude in terms of what we kind of projects we could initiate with the money. As the Coalition command structure in the province matured over the last months of the tour, however, limitations on the scope of projects were imposed for oversight reasons.
In our last months in country, my team initiated a contract to build a school in a village that desperately needed a facility. My team developed quite a rapport with the local populace, many of whom were once Taliban. This project would aid the change in their perceptions of Americans. Unfortunately, just after the agreement had been with the local contractor, the Coalition refined the project guidance stating that schools could built only with funds that my team did not possess. Against the advise of my NCOs, I had no choice than to call off the project. There was no doubt the locals were upset and my men had lost confidence in me. My team sergeant told me that the school village was so far out in the “middle of nowhere” no one will ever know. Despite the pressures of my NCOs and the local populace, I knew that I made the right ethical choice.
Months later, after my team had redeployed, our project budget for Afghanistan was audited. I later found out that in response to large-scale abuse of project funds, the Coalition sent inspectors throughout the Afghani countryside to ensure money was spent properly. As a result, many officers and NCOs lost careers over misallocation of funds. My team, however, was spared. Taking the “hard right” is never easy, but have to deal with the potential implications of the “easy left” is worse.
As a company commander, I had to take money away from soldiers who were raised in an environment in which leaders did not want to make hard choices. As a team leader, I had to delay the effects of winning hearts and minds of the local populace and admiration of my NCOs to ensure project money allocation fell within regulation. In the end, however, keeping my integrity prevented soldiers from getting money taken out of their paychecks and senior NCOs from losing their careers. From these experiences and many others, not as dramatic, I have realized that integrity is a value that is hard maintain during struggling times, but it always pays dividends in the end.
I define integrity as choosing what is right even if it means losing a popularity contest with your subordinates. I have tested the definition of this value both as a company commander, responsible for 120 soldiers, and as a civil affairs team leader, in charge of three senior NCOs. In both situations, I have made decisions that, in the short run, were unpopular, but paid off dividends in the end. As a company commander, I was told by the Brigade Sergeants Major (SGM) that, by regulation, when soldiers go to the field, they must have their separate rations taken away; however, the SGM went on to say that “it was no big deal though…..all commanders on this post let their soldiers keep their separate rats”. After researching the regulation, I found that it was indeed true. I immediately enacted the paperwork to stop everyone’s separate rations before the next field problem. As a result, word spread around the brigade that I was taking money from soldiers. Senior NCOs and some officers pressured me to change this policy. I resisted, stating that this is the regulation and I must abide.
A couple of months after my policy correction, a no-notice inspection team from Ft Bragg, NC showed up at my brigade. Their mission was to inspect all administrative areas. The team went through every company leaving no rock left unturned. One of the “rocks” was rations paperwork for field problems. As a result, many of my fellow company commanders received counseling statements due to their negligence of the separate rations regulation. On the other hand, my company was recognized for correcting a systemic problem with separate rations throughout the brigade.
The principles of integrity also play a role on a team. As a team leader in charge of three senior NCOs in Afghanistan, I had the responsibility for small scale civic projects throughout a very remote province. At the time, only a handful of Coalition Forces were operating in this province. My team was given a lot of cash in order to contract for projects. Initially, we were given a lot of latitude in terms of what we kind of projects we could initiate with the money. As the Coalition command structure in the province matured over the last months of the tour, however, limitations on the scope of projects were imposed for oversight reasons.
In our last months in country, my team initiated a contract to build a school in a village that desperately needed a facility. My team developed quite a rapport with the local populace, many of whom were once Taliban. This project would aid the change in their perceptions of Americans. Unfortunately, just after the agreement had been with the local contractor, the Coalition refined the project guidance stating that schools could built only with funds that my team did not possess. Against the advise of my NCOs, I had no choice than to call off the project. There was no doubt the locals were upset and my men had lost confidence in me. My team sergeant told me that the school village was so far out in the “middle of nowhere” no one will ever know. Despite the pressures of my NCOs and the local populace, I knew that I made the right ethical choice.
Months later, after my team had redeployed, our project budget for Afghanistan was audited. I later found out that in response to large-scale abuse of project funds, the Coalition sent inspectors throughout the Afghani countryside to ensure money was spent properly. As a result, many officers and NCOs lost careers over misallocation of funds. My team, however, was spared. Taking the “hard right” is never easy, but have to deal with the potential implications of the “easy left” is worse.
As a company commander, I had to take money away from soldiers who were raised in an environment in which leaders did not want to make hard choices. As a team leader, I had to delay the effects of winning hearts and minds of the local populace and admiration of my NCOs to ensure project money allocation fell within regulation. In the end, however, keeping my integrity prevented soldiers from getting money taken out of their paychecks and senior NCOs from losing their careers. From these experiences and many others, not as dramatic, I have realized that integrity is a value that is hard maintain during struggling times, but it always pays dividends in the end.
This posting does not nessecarily reflect the official stance of the United States Army. This is my own work and reflects my opinion.
Friday, December 12, 2008
Tree Camaraderie
It started out like any other tasking in CGSC. All CGSC students were given the dubious task of completing STRATCOM requirements. One of the specific tasks of STRATCOM is to complete a community engagement. Most of us struggled with what to do in order to complete our community engagement. MAJ Thomas Laybourn had fortunately received a request from the Girls Scouts on Ft. Leavenworth to remove some dead trees from in front of the Hasting House. The Hasting House is a remodeled stable from the early days of Ft Leavenworth build in the1930s. The Hasting House is a historic building the Girl Scouts use to have their meetings. I knew about the building because my daughter is a Girl Scout.
After the offer was made by Tom we had to decide the best time to remove the trees. We went through an extensive military decision making process (MDMP) to identify the endstate, objectives and key task. After much deliberation, we decided on the appropriate weekend and meet at the PX on Ft Leavenworth.
There were about nine of us that volunteered our Saturday to help. We had some serious logging tools like axes, saws, rope and shovels--not to mention a Toyota Tundra truck for pulling. Once we arrived at the Hasting House we identified the five trees that needed to be removed, and went immediately to work. The first few trees we removed gave us the impression the task would be easy and we would make quick work of the remaining trees.
We chopped, pushed, and pulled trees that were about three to four inches thick in diameter. While we had success initially the last tree was not as cooperative. As we continued I began to ask myself how many Army Majors does it take to remove a tree? We obviously needed some expert help. It ended up taking an hour of chopping, digging, pushing, pulling on that one tree. What I did not mention was that we tied the begrudging tree to the aforementioned Toyota. Needless to say the tree won that round. Thank goodness, we did not pull the truck apart.
After several different approaches, techniques and deliberation about removing the tree we had an epiphany. We dug around the tree some more and found out there was still a live root at the base of the tree. It took about four or five good chops to remove stubborn root.
After our accomplishments we took a photo as proof of the obstinate tree. Proud of our accomplishments and ourselves we stood around and talked about class, deployments, future jobs, family and of course that last tree. We all felt a since of camaraderie and accomplishment you just do not get from conducting the awe inspiring MDMP.
We concluded with putting all the dirt back in the holes and having some cold beers as a well deserved reward. I look forward to the final phase of planting new trees in the spring. I’m sure we will have as much fun planting as we did pulling up the trees along with the since of satisfaction that we came together as a class and helped the community in the process. You always learn more about yourself and others when you work outside the confines of the classroom.
In conclusion, I had a great time tackling the project with my classmate and have the scars on my shoulders to prove it. We not only completed our community engagement for our STRATCOM requirement we all bonded and felt good about helping the community.
After the offer was made by Tom we had to decide the best time to remove the trees. We went through an extensive military decision making process (MDMP) to identify the endstate, objectives and key task. After much deliberation, we decided on the appropriate weekend and meet at the PX on Ft Leavenworth.
There were about nine of us that volunteered our Saturday to help. We had some serious logging tools like axes, saws, rope and shovels--not to mention a Toyota Tundra truck for pulling. Once we arrived at the Hasting House we identified the five trees that needed to be removed, and went immediately to work. The first few trees we removed gave us the impression the task would be easy and we would make quick work of the remaining trees.
We chopped, pushed, and pulled trees that were about three to four inches thick in diameter. While we had success initially the last tree was not as cooperative. As we continued I began to ask myself how many Army Majors does it take to remove a tree? We obviously needed some expert help. It ended up taking an hour of chopping, digging, pushing, pulling on that one tree. What I did not mention was that we tied the begrudging tree to the aforementioned Toyota. Needless to say the tree won that round. Thank goodness, we did not pull the truck apart.
After several different approaches, techniques and deliberation about removing the tree we had an epiphany. We dug around the tree some more and found out there was still a live root at the base of the tree. It took about four or five good chops to remove stubborn root.
After our accomplishments we took a photo as proof of the obstinate tree. Proud of our accomplishments and ourselves we stood around and talked about class, deployments, future jobs, family and of course that last tree. We all felt a since of camaraderie and accomplishment you just do not get from conducting the awe inspiring MDMP.
We concluded with putting all the dirt back in the holes and having some cold beers as a well deserved reward. I look forward to the final phase of planting new trees in the spring. I’m sure we will have as much fun planting as we did pulling up the trees along with the since of satisfaction that we came together as a class and helped the community in the process. You always learn more about yourself and others when you work outside the confines of the classroom.
In conclusion, I had a great time tackling the project with my classmate and have the scars on my shoulders to prove it. We not only completed our community engagement for our STRATCOM requirement we all bonded and felt good about helping the community.
Thursday, December 11, 2008
Modernizing the USAF--"Cutting Edge" or "Good Enough?"
by Maj Chris McMartin, USAF
NOTE: The following is the opinion of the author and does not necessarily reflect the views, policy, or opinion of the Department of Defense or United States Air Force.
The United States Air Force in its various incarnations has enjoyed a technological advantage over every other nation’s air arm practically since the dawn of powered flight. Since World War Two, this advantage has come at an increasing cost, to the point where in 2005 the Air Force was willing to reduce its personnel end strength by 40,000 Airmen, in part to justify the purchase of a few additional fighters.[i] It is imperative the incoming Presidential Administration reverse this trend. The Administration should opt instead to recapitalize the Air Force by purchasing “sufficient” advanced weapon systems instead of absolute cutting-edge technology. In doing so, the Air Force will be able to afford both more aircraft more often as well as more personnel. The effects will be reduced fatigue and operations tempo, and a more rapid technology deployment cycle to better keep up with changing threats.
The trend in spiraling costs for military aircraft is not new. Three decades ago, an Air Force major lamented the fact that, despite technology typically driving prices down (as in the case of automobiles), fighter aircraft cost eight times as much per pound by the 1970s as they did in World War Two—a cost increase six times as high as that for commercial aircraft.[ii] His suggestion was to pay several aircraft manufacturers an annual fee to develop new aircraft regularly, in order to keep development costs down. I suggest a different approach, more attuned to the computer age.
Moore’s Law from 1965 stipulates the number of transistors on a computer chip (and, by extension, computing power) doubles every 24 months. This hypothesis has proven true over the last 40-plus years.[iii] An end-user corollary is that no matter what computer a consumer buys, it will be obsolete in two years. This has led some industry pundits to advise consumers to purchase as much computer as they can possibly afford, so that it will not go obsolete as quickly as a cheaper (and presumably less-powerful) model. The consequence of such a decision is to hold on to that expensive computer as long as possible to “get the consumer’s money’s worth,” even though by the time it is finally retired it is several generations behind the current technology. The Air Force’s current inventory, which includes KC-135s and B-52s—both designs over 50 years old—seems to reflect this mentality.
However, a different school of thought posits that buying only sufficient computing power needed at the time is more efficient, as not only will the purchase be cheaper, the difference in price can be applied toward a more powerful model as the newer technology’s price decreases in the future. This concept can easily translate into military aircraft purchases.
A combination of superior technology and superior crew training gives the United States its decisive edge in air power. The technology advantage has typically been very large, though the Former Soviet Union made great strides in this respect during the 1980s and 1990s with their fourth- and fifth-generation fighters. Given the absence of this peer competitor, and the next peer competitor (China) still lagging in the technological realm, the Air Force needs simply to buy aircraft that are “good enough” to preserve a small, but still present, technological advantage. The cost savings realized by this approach would free up funds to allocate towards near-term future aircraft purchases, instead of being committed to maintaining outdated technology for a longer period of time.
Not only would this approach to aircraft procurement allow for more rapid “technology refreshes” than current practice; the reduced cost would provide funding for more individual aircraft as well as more personnel in the force. This would have a two-pronged effect.
First, the Air Force would be more flexible in that it could operate in more theaters simultaneously. Currently, because each type of aircraft costs so much (not just fighters, but support aircraft such as C-17s), fewer of each type are produced. An aircraft cannot be in two locations at once, so the lower numbers of aircraft must be prioritized as to which theater will receive their services (a prime example today is the “low density/high demand” concept evident in most ISR platforms). Having more aircraft available also means individual aircraft would not have to fly as many hours as they currently sustain, thereby increasing their service life. The War on Terror has already shortened the programmed service life of C-17s to the point that analysts say up to three times the originally-budgeted number of planes will be needed to sustain combat support operations.[iv]
Second, an addition in personnel end strength would reduce operations tempo. This year the Air Force announced a restructuring of its Aerospace Expeditionary Force (AEF) concept, which initially entailed a 1:4 dwell ratio (4 months deployed, 16 months at home station), to reflect the reality of many personnel in “stressed” career fields experiencing a 1:1 dwell (in some cases, 6 months deployed, 6 months at home station ad infinitum).[v] While the move was meant to better align the AEF cycle with joint planning constraints, it tacitly acknowledges the increasing operations tempo for career fields suffering a decline in their experienced personnel (for example, Security Forces) due to both voluntary and involuntary separations. Thankfully, Secretary of Defense put an end to the 40,000-troop force reduction in progress and proposed increasing end strength in the next few years.[vi] Future savings from buying sufficient rather than cutting-edge aircraft would enable the Air Force to build back up to previous personnel levels, helping to alleviate the pain in these stressed career fields.
Critics of this proposal to buy “good enough” vs. “absolute best” aircraft may worry about falling behind technologically. However, as previously mentioned, the Air Force’s advantage comes not only from superior equipment but superior training. General “Buster” Ellis, former commander 19th Air Force (Air Education and Training Command), extols the virtues of America’s superior pilot training—a combination of instructor ability and simulators.[vii]
The synergy offered by the combination of superior training and the proposed “sufficiently” advanced aircraft will maintain the United States Air Force’s combat edge and, more importantly, will allow for aircraft refresh cycles to be greatly reduced—clearly an advantage when working to counter an ever-changing threat scenario.
Military aircraft costs have increased too quickly for too long. The next Presidential Administration has a golden opportunity to reverse this trend and argue for sufficiency rather than cutting-edge technology for the next generation of aircraft. The savings realized can be immediately put to use in rejuvenating personnel end strength, reducing operations tempo in critical career fields, and purchasing more aircraft, extending service life for the entire fleet. In the long term, the ability to develop and field new aircraft using the savings from buying “good enough” aircraft now will pay dividends in allowing the Air Force to recapitalize its inventory more often to counter constantly changing adversaries worldwide.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[i] Wynne, Michael W. and General T. Michael Moseley. Air Force Posture Statement 2008, page 18.
[ii] Stark, Major Frederick T. “Why Military Airplanes Cost So Much and What Can Be Done About It.” Air University Review, Nov-Dec 1973.
[iii] “Moore’s Law—Made Real by Intel Innovation.” http://www.intel.com/technology/mooreslaw/; accessed 20 Oct 2008.
[iv] “Air Transportation” 17 April 2005. Strategy Page web site. http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htairmo/articles/20050417.aspx; accessed 20 Oct 2008.
[v] Wicke, TSgt Russell. “AEF Evolves for Stressed Career Fields.” Air Force Link, 02 June 2008. http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123101035; accessed 20 Oct 2008.
[vi] Randolph, SSgt Monique. “Air Force Charts New Course for 2009 Force Shaping.” Air Force Link, 12 June 2008. http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123102609; accessed 20 Oct 2008.
[vii] Miles, Donna. “Aircrew Training Ensures U.S. Air Superiority.” American Forces Press Service, 07 Sep 2004. http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=25383; accessed 20 Oct 2008.
NOTE: The following is the opinion of the author and does not necessarily reflect the views, policy, or opinion of the Department of Defense or United States Air Force.
The United States Air Force in its various incarnations has enjoyed a technological advantage over every other nation’s air arm practically since the dawn of powered flight. Since World War Two, this advantage has come at an increasing cost, to the point where in 2005 the Air Force was willing to reduce its personnel end strength by 40,000 Airmen, in part to justify the purchase of a few additional fighters.[i] It is imperative the incoming Presidential Administration reverse this trend. The Administration should opt instead to recapitalize the Air Force by purchasing “sufficient” advanced weapon systems instead of absolute cutting-edge technology. In doing so, the Air Force will be able to afford both more aircraft more often as well as more personnel. The effects will be reduced fatigue and operations tempo, and a more rapid technology deployment cycle to better keep up with changing threats.
The trend in spiraling costs for military aircraft is not new. Three decades ago, an Air Force major lamented the fact that, despite technology typically driving prices down (as in the case of automobiles), fighter aircraft cost eight times as much per pound by the 1970s as they did in World War Two—a cost increase six times as high as that for commercial aircraft.[ii] His suggestion was to pay several aircraft manufacturers an annual fee to develop new aircraft regularly, in order to keep development costs down. I suggest a different approach, more attuned to the computer age.
Moore’s Law from 1965 stipulates the number of transistors on a computer chip (and, by extension, computing power) doubles every 24 months. This hypothesis has proven true over the last 40-plus years.[iii] An end-user corollary is that no matter what computer a consumer buys, it will be obsolete in two years. This has led some industry pundits to advise consumers to purchase as much computer as they can possibly afford, so that it will not go obsolete as quickly as a cheaper (and presumably less-powerful) model. The consequence of such a decision is to hold on to that expensive computer as long as possible to “get the consumer’s money’s worth,” even though by the time it is finally retired it is several generations behind the current technology. The Air Force’s current inventory, which includes KC-135s and B-52s—both designs over 50 years old—seems to reflect this mentality.
However, a different school of thought posits that buying only sufficient computing power needed at the time is more efficient, as not only will the purchase be cheaper, the difference in price can be applied toward a more powerful model as the newer technology’s price decreases in the future. This concept can easily translate into military aircraft purchases.
A combination of superior technology and superior crew training gives the United States its decisive edge in air power. The technology advantage has typically been very large, though the Former Soviet Union made great strides in this respect during the 1980s and 1990s with their fourth- and fifth-generation fighters. Given the absence of this peer competitor, and the next peer competitor (China) still lagging in the technological realm, the Air Force needs simply to buy aircraft that are “good enough” to preserve a small, but still present, technological advantage. The cost savings realized by this approach would free up funds to allocate towards near-term future aircraft purchases, instead of being committed to maintaining outdated technology for a longer period of time.
Not only would this approach to aircraft procurement allow for more rapid “technology refreshes” than current practice; the reduced cost would provide funding for more individual aircraft as well as more personnel in the force. This would have a two-pronged effect.
First, the Air Force would be more flexible in that it could operate in more theaters simultaneously. Currently, because each type of aircraft costs so much (not just fighters, but support aircraft such as C-17s), fewer of each type are produced. An aircraft cannot be in two locations at once, so the lower numbers of aircraft must be prioritized as to which theater will receive their services (a prime example today is the “low density/high demand” concept evident in most ISR platforms). Having more aircraft available also means individual aircraft would not have to fly as many hours as they currently sustain, thereby increasing their service life. The War on Terror has already shortened the programmed service life of C-17s to the point that analysts say up to three times the originally-budgeted number of planes will be needed to sustain combat support operations.[iv]
Second, an addition in personnel end strength would reduce operations tempo. This year the Air Force announced a restructuring of its Aerospace Expeditionary Force (AEF) concept, which initially entailed a 1:4 dwell ratio (4 months deployed, 16 months at home station), to reflect the reality of many personnel in “stressed” career fields experiencing a 1:1 dwell (in some cases, 6 months deployed, 6 months at home station ad infinitum).[v] While the move was meant to better align the AEF cycle with joint planning constraints, it tacitly acknowledges the increasing operations tempo for career fields suffering a decline in their experienced personnel (for example, Security Forces) due to both voluntary and involuntary separations. Thankfully, Secretary of Defense put an end to the 40,000-troop force reduction in progress and proposed increasing end strength in the next few years.[vi] Future savings from buying sufficient rather than cutting-edge aircraft would enable the Air Force to build back up to previous personnel levels, helping to alleviate the pain in these stressed career fields.
Critics of this proposal to buy “good enough” vs. “absolute best” aircraft may worry about falling behind technologically. However, as previously mentioned, the Air Force’s advantage comes not only from superior equipment but superior training. General “Buster” Ellis, former commander 19th Air Force (Air Education and Training Command), extols the virtues of America’s superior pilot training—a combination of instructor ability and simulators.[vii]
The synergy offered by the combination of superior training and the proposed “sufficiently” advanced aircraft will maintain the United States Air Force’s combat edge and, more importantly, will allow for aircraft refresh cycles to be greatly reduced—clearly an advantage when working to counter an ever-changing threat scenario.
Military aircraft costs have increased too quickly for too long. The next Presidential Administration has a golden opportunity to reverse this trend and argue for sufficiency rather than cutting-edge technology for the next generation of aircraft. The savings realized can be immediately put to use in rejuvenating personnel end strength, reducing operations tempo in critical career fields, and purchasing more aircraft, extending service life for the entire fleet. In the long term, the ability to develop and field new aircraft using the savings from buying “good enough” aircraft now will pay dividends in allowing the Air Force to recapitalize its inventory more often to counter constantly changing adversaries worldwide.
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[i] Wynne, Michael W. and General T. Michael Moseley. Air Force Posture Statement 2008, page 18.
[ii] Stark, Major Frederick T. “Why Military Airplanes Cost So Much and What Can Be Done About It.” Air University Review, Nov-Dec 1973.
[iii] “Moore’s Law—Made Real by Intel Innovation.” http://www.intel.com/technology/mooreslaw/; accessed 20 Oct 2008.
[iv] “Air Transportation” 17 April 2005. Strategy Page web site. http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htairmo/articles/20050417.aspx; accessed 20 Oct 2008.
[v] Wicke, TSgt Russell. “AEF Evolves for Stressed Career Fields.” Air Force Link, 02 June 2008. http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123101035; accessed 20 Oct 2008.
[vi] Randolph, SSgt Monique. “Air Force Charts New Course for 2009 Force Shaping.” Air Force Link, 12 June 2008. http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123102609; accessed 20 Oct 2008.
[vii] Miles, Donna. “Aircrew Training Ensures U.S. Air Superiority.” American Forces Press Service, 07 Sep 2004. http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=25383; accessed 20 Oct 2008.
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